Features

October 1, 2007

OP-ED | Iraq: Seize the Chance for Change

By Miranda Sissons

Last month's testimonies by General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker focused on unanswerable questions, like whether Iraq is ungovernable and how long the U.S. should stay there. But no one discussed the concrete measures that could be taken to work toward political progress. Chief among these is the question of Deba'athification, the legacy of the disastrous 2003 decision to disband the Iraqi army and purge its civilian government.

Deba'athification has served many ends in Iraq, few of them good. Apart from its destruction of the Iraqi army, it has two major weaknesses. First, it automatically designates certain levels of party members as abusers who should be dismissed from office, regardless of their individual actions. That is both unfair and ineffective.

Second, the Deba'athification Commission has become the feared attack dog in Iraqi politics, striking down election candidates, judges, and government employees with no explanation or chance for meaningful appeal. It's no surprise that Deba'athification has generated so much political and popular fury in Iraq.

Deba'athification has never been what Iraq has so badly needed: a robust and well-designed vetting program to remove abusers from government, the armed forces, and the police. Examples of such programs exist in El Salvador, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and elsewhere. The 50 years following post-World War II De-Nazification measures have yielded scores of vetting lessons. It's a shame that no U.S. or Iraqi policymakers have learned from them.

New Deba'athification legislation hit the Iraqi parliament floor late last month. On paper, the new law is only a partial improvement. Removal measures can apply to a higher rank of membership than is currently the case, and former army personnel appear to have the right to reapply for their positions or be given pensions.

But the draft will continue to cement already-existing tensions. The emphasis on guilt by association-a fundamental violation of human rights-will remain. The powers of the hated Deba'athification Commission will actually grow with the addition of public prosecutors. The system will also continue to lack basic procedural and oversight safeguards, including an independent appeals process. Neither the U.S. nor the Iraqis appear to know the first thing about what an effective vetting process might look like.

The draft is likely to encounter significant opposition in parliament. Policymakers should seize the chance to create a better deal. The best move for Iraq would be to dismantle the Deba'athification system within six to twelve months. The focus should then shift to the future, and well-designed selection, appointment, promotion, and disciplinary processes for public officials should be put in place. In such a system, all individuals-not just former Ba'ath party members-who have committed crimes or lack either integrity or competence would be screened out. Rather than feeding currents of distrust and anger, this would lay the foundation for competent government and rebuild the bonds of trust between Iraqis and their state.

It's also urgent that vetting mechanisms for the police and armed forces be strengthened. Recruitment is skyrocketing. If we are not to repeat the mistakes of the past, quality control mechanisms must be put into place, a call also made by an independent commission on Iraq's security forces. Stronger training and vetting systems are essential if Iraq is to have disciplined and professional police and military forces.

At the end of the day, however, vetting is only vetting: it helps rebuild institutions, but it does not give victims the sense that justice has been done. That's why it is essential that any transition from Deba'athification to vetting be accompanied by other measures. Most Iraqis define Deba'athification too broadly: as a comprehensive series of goals for punishing, seeking justice, and preventing Ba'athist resurgence. But no one initiative-no matter how well-endowed-could ever possibly achieve these objectives.

A sound approach must include vetting plus steps to improve accountability and protection. Examples of such measures include reparations for victims (a wildly popular concept), truth-telling initiatives, and robust laws to prevent the rise of intolerant regimes. All of these would give victims a greater sense of justice and attract greater political buy-in. Some measures already exist, but they are ineffective and lack political support. This can change: Iraqis have plenty of ideas, but no one has been listening.

Vetting programs are inherently controversial in that they affect individuals' access to power. But some are more effective than others, particularly when coupled with other coherent public service reforms. The Iraqi parliament still has the chance to end the counterproductive Deba'athification program and try to put into place a solution that would be more effective and more durable. Such a step would greatly dissipate anger and help rebuild social trust among Iraqis. No one has yet even tried to seize this promising opportunity. But the stakes are too important to let it slip.

Miranda Sissons is Deputy Director, Middle East Program at the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and is head of its Iraq program. The ICTJ has monitored Deba'athification closely since 2003.