Press Releases:

August 17, 2006

Iraq: Tribunal Must Improve Efforts in Anfal Trial

Lessons from Dujail Should be Used to Increase Tribunal's Competence, Fairness, and Security 

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Contact:
Kasia Reterska
Press Relations Officer
TEL +1 917.637.3847
E-MAIL kreterska@ictj.org

Miranda Sissons
Senior Associate, MENA Program
TEL +1 646.515.3712
E-MAIL msissons@ictj.org

BAGHDAD AND NEW YORK, August 17, 2006-The start of the Anfal trial on August 21 presents a historic opportunity to strengthen justice in Iraq, the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) said today. But to improve its capacity to deliver fairness and accountability, the Iraqi Higher Tribunal must apply key lessons learned from the Dujail trial.

"This is a crucial moment," said Miranda Sissons, head of the Iraq program and a frequent courtroom observer for the ICTJ in Baghdad. "If properly handled, the Anfal trial could show Iraqis the true meaning of accountability. But the Tribunal will have to make strong efforts to show it has learned from previous experience or else risk further undermining itself."

Saddam Hussein, his cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid, and five other defendants will face a range of charges in the Anfal trial, including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The charges are based on violations committed during the 1988 "Anfal campaign" -a series of massive and coordinated attacks by Iraqi forces targeting the Kurdish population of northern Iraq. The campaign, which involved the repeated use of chemical weapons, caused the murder and enforced disappearance of up to 100,000 civilians and resulted in the near total destruction of local infrastructure.

The Anfal trial-the Tribunal's second following Dujail, which is in recess until October 16-promises to be both legally and factually more complex than its predecessor. The amount of documentary evidence and witness testimony will present enormous administrative challenges, urgently requiring the Tribunal to make significant amendments to its proceedings.

Based on its extensive on-the-ground monitoring of the Dujail trial, the Center has identified six key steps the Tribunal must take to help it meet the challenges ahead.

To ensure its competence to hold a fair and effective trial in the Anfal case, the Tribunal should:

• Safeguard judicial independence. The Tribunal's leadership should not allow judicial assignments to be influenced by external actors. It should adhere to the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, as should all Iraqi leaders and government bodies;

• Enact effective, durable security arrangements for all participants, including court officials, defense lawyers, witnesses, and observers. The Tribunal has suffered severe security problems, with some eight participants killed so far;

• Ensure that evidence is presented and tested more thoroughly. Those who commit crimes such as genocide often do so using a maze of complex machinery. It should be explicitly clear to the Tribunal's judges-and conveyed to the Iraqi public-exactly who is alleged to have committed what crimes and how. In order to improve its capacities in this regard, the Tribunal should seriously consider expanding its use of international expertise;

• Develop a stronger understanding of the role of the defense. The defense does not just serve the interests of the accused, but is a vital safeguard that serves the interest of the court. The court needs better and more transparent tools with which to discipline any unprofessional behavior by defense counsel, but must also fulfill its responsibility to ensure that defendants are adequately represented, for example, by facilitating the provision of documents to defense counsel;

• Regularize its procedures, especially in regard to witness confidentiality and response to motions. Regular procedures are vital to both the perception and practice of fairness; and

• Immediately initiate a strong outreach program. To date, the Tribunal has failed to engage in even basic outreach. Consequently, Iraqis have had little stake in-or understanding of-the details of the Dujail trial. This lack of involvement sharply diminishes the argued benefits of basing the Tribunal inside Iraq.

"Anfal is an incredibly important and complex case," said Sissons. "International legal experts may have overlooked some of Dujail's shortcomings because it was the Tribunal's first case, but they'll be less tolerant with Anfal. Trying such serious crimes under extremely challenging conditions makes it all the more urgent for the Tribunal to put truly effective judicial practices in place."

Background to the Trial

The Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal was created by order of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in 2003 and incorporated into domestic Iraqi law on October 18, 2005. The Tribunal has jurisdiction over Iraqis and Iraqi residents who are alleged to have committed genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes between July 17, 1968 and May 1, 2003. It also has jurisdiction over violations of some Iraqi laws, such as interference in the affairs of the judiciary or the wasting of national resources.

The Tribunal's staff is entirely Iraqi, though its statute permits it to appoint international advisers. The Regime Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO), based out of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, supports the Tribunal's investigative and logistical needs.

The Anfal trial will be heard by the five judges of the second trial chamber, with charges being brought against the following seven defendants:

• Tahir Tawfiq Al-‘Aani: Former Governor of Mosul, Ba'ath Party official, and assistant to Ali Hassan al-Majid;

• Sabr Abdul-Aziz al-Douri: Former General Director of Iraq's Military Intelligence Service;

• Farhan Mutlak Al-Jaburi: Former Director of the Military Intelligence Service of the northern region;

• Sultan Hashem Ahmed al-Ta'i: Former Commander of Corps I of the Iraqi Army, in charge of the northern sector during the Anfal campaign. Later became Minister of Defense;

• Ali Hassan al-Majid Al-Tikriti: Alleged architect of the Anfal campaign, and cousin of Saddam Hussein. Secretary-General of the Ba'ath Party's northern bureau from March 1987 to April 1989, with authority over all state agencies in the Kurdish region during this period;

• Hussein Rashid Al-Tikriti: Former Deputy for Operational Affairs to the Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Army during the Anfal campaign; and

• Saddam Hussein al-Majid Al-Tikriti: President of Iraq from 1979 until 2003.

According to Tribunal documents, the charges are as follows:

• Saddam Hussein and Ali Hassan al-Majid are charged with genocide under article 11(1) A and C of the Tribunal statute;

• All defendants are charged with crimes against humanity. Charges are made under article 12(1) A, C, E of the Tribunal statute. They include willful killing, enslavement, and imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty; and

• All defendants, except Tahir Tawfiq Al-‘Ani, are charged with war crimes under article 13(4) A, D, L of the Tribunal statute. Charges include intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population; intentionally directing attacks against cultural, religious, medical, educational, or other buildings not used for military purposes; and the destruction or seizure of property not imperatively demanded by the necessities of conflict.

Additional Tribunal Resources

The Tribunal Statute of October 18, 2005
(English, ICTJ translation)
(Arabic)

The Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence of October 18, 2005
(English, ICTJ translation)
(Arabic)

ICTJ briefing paper: "The Creation and First Trials before the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal," November 2005.

Also see, the ICTJ's Iraq page.

About the ICTJ

The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) assists countries pursuing accountability for past mass atrocity or human rights abuse. The Center works in societies emerging from repressive rule or armed conflict, as well as in established democracies where historical injustices or systemic abuse remain unresolved.

In order to promote justice, peace, and reconciliation, government officials and nongovernmental advocates are likely to consider a variety of transitional justice approaches including both judicial and nonjudicial responses to human rights crimes. The ICTJ assists in the development of integrated, comprehensive, and localized approaches to transitional justice comprising five key elements: prosecuting perpetrators, documenting and acknowledging violations through non-judicial means such as truth commissions, reforming abusive institutions, providing reparations to victims, and facilitating reconciliation processes.

The Center is committed to building local capacity and generally strengthening the emerging field of transitional justice, and works closely with organizations and experts around the world to do so. By working in the field through local languages, the ICTJ provides comparative information, legal and policy analysis, documentation, and strategic research to justice and truth-seeking institutions, nongovernmental organizations, governments and others.