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ICTJ Activity

The ICTJ has actively supported efforts in Timor-Leste to address the legacy of human rights violations and impunity left by 24 years of Indonesian occupation and internal conflict. It has assisted and monitored truth-seeking mechanisms and prosecutions, supported efforts to ensure the dissemination and implementation of findings and recommendations by East Timor's truth commission, and assisted in the creation of a national reparations program.

The Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation

The Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation (CAVR) was created in 2001 and carried out its work from 2002 to 2005. The ICTJ provided advice on the design of the Commission and later helped with the structure and production of the CAVR's final report. ICTJ consultants assisted research of several aspects of the Commission's work, such as international law, violations of economic and social rights, reparations, memorialization, and guarantees of non-recurrence.

Although the Commission had planned for its final report to be released to the public immediately or soon after being handed over to Timor's then-President Xanana Gusmao in October 2005, the president chose to release it to the Timorese Parliament and prime minister in November 2005. Along with other international and local human rights organizations, the ICTJ publicly criticized the government for its inaction and called on it to make the report available to the public immediately. In January 2006 the final report was posted on the ICTJ Web site.

The ICTJ has continued to call for official responses to the CAVR's final report. The Center is currently working closely with the post-CAVR Technical Secretariat (STP-CAVR) to provide input to the Timorese Parliament on the implementation of the CAVR's recommendations. Civil society and parliamentarians are now discussing one of the CAVR's most important recommendations, that a national reparations scheme be established for victims of the conflicts. The ICTJ is providing technical assistance.

Investigation and Prosecution of Serious Crimes

During the work of the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) the ICTJ helped the unit bring Indonesian officials and their subordinates to justice for the atrocities committed in 1999. The Center continues to support prosecutorial and judicial action, demanding accountability for indicted high-level perpetrators. From 2003 until an international Commission of Experts (COE) was established in February 2005, the ICTJ called on the UN to establish the COE to look into impunity for the 1999 crimes and to devise workable, efficient, and fair strategies to ensure accountability. Cooperating closely with the COE, the Center urged the UN to acknowledge the Commission's findings and carry out its recommendations.

When the SCU approached the date of its mandated dissolution in May 2005, the ICTJ facilitated an international advocacy effort to postpone the disbanding of the unit. Thus the UN Security Council could consider the COE's recommendations before deciding on its future. The Center also facilitated consultations that led to a consensus among Timorese, Indonesian, and international organizations on the future of the serious crimes process, rejecting impunity and political priorities that ignore the rights of victims.

To facilitate the debate about accountability, the ICTJ produced a report in August 2003, "Crying Without Tears: In Pursuit of Justice and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste," which examined the perspectives of a cross-section of Timorese citizens on violence, truth, justice, and reconciliation. In June 2005 the Center published "Justice Abandoned?", a paper assessing the work of the SCU and the hybrid panels of judges established by the UN. Another report, "The Serious Crime Process in Timor-Leste: In Retrospect," evaluated the Serious Crimes Process in April 2006.

The Center is now monitoring the work of the UN's Serious Crimes Investigation Team (SCIT). This team has a mandate to investigate serious crimes committed in 1999 but leaves their prosecution in the hands of the Timorese prosecutor-general. SCIT began substantive work in February 2008.

The Commission of Truth and Friendship

In December 2004 Indonesia and Timor-Leste agreed to establish a Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF). Under the terms of reference agreed by the presidents of Timor-Leste and Indonesia in March 2005, the CTF fails to protect victims' rights and fulfill state obligations, and it has the power to recommend amnesties for perpetrators of crimes against humanity. At the time the ICTJ expressed serious reservations about the establishment of the CTF. Since then the ICTJ has monitored the CTF's work, including its public hearings. Based on serious concerns about these events and the unsubstantiated claims members of the Indonesian military made against the United Nations, the ICTJ has called on the UN to publicly refute allegations of fraud against UNAMET. In January 2008 the Center published its report, "Too Much Friendship, Too Little Truth," which reviews the creation of the CTF and its public hearings. It concludes that so far the Commission has failed to deliver transitional justice goals.

Civil Society and Victims' Groups

The Center's work in Timor-Leste continues to rely strongly on consultation with Indonesian and Timorese civil society groups, including the Judicial System Monitoring Program and Hak Association in Timor, as well as the Human Rights Working Group and KontraS in Indonesia. This collaborative approach has contributed to the establishment of the COE, the continuity of the SCU, and support for the CAVR.

The ICTJ program in Timor-Leste is currently focusing on enhancing national dialogue about transitional justice issues and strengthening the role of local NGOs and victims' groups in the debate. An issue of particular importance is the need for public institutions, including the Timorese Parliament, to respond to the final report of the CAVR.

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Background

Timor-Leste, a former Portuguese colony, was forcibly annexed by Indonesia in 1975, after a period of civil war. For 24 years Timor-Leste suffered the effects of brutal counterinsurgency tactics against nationalist guerrillas. In 1999, a year after the fall of the authoritarian regime led by General Soeharto, Indonesia accepted that the Timorese population would hold a referendum on the territory's future. On August 30 of that year 78 percent of Timorese voted for independence.

The vote was preceded by a widespread campaign of intimidation that turned into brutal reprisals after the results indicating overwhelming support for independence were released. Pro-Indonesian militias killed an estimated 1,400 Timorese civilians and destroyed most of the territory's infrastructure. More than 200,000 individuals fled or were forced into Indonesian West Timor in a spasm of violence that ended only because of the intervention of UN-authorized troops and the establishment of a transitional UN authority (UNTAET). In May 2002 Timor-Leste finally became an independent state.

UNTAET established a prosecutorial authority, the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU), and hybrid national-international courts-the Special Panels for Serious Crimes-to bring suspects to trial. Since its creation the SCU has indicted 395 people for crimes against humanity and other serious violations. It has ensured the conviction of 81, mainly low-level, perpetrators. However, the majority of indictees, including high-level Indonesian officials, remain at large in Indonesian territory. The Indonesian government has refused to cooperate with the prosecutions and has conducted biased and unfair trials of some of the suspects.

After independence the serious crimes process became part of Timor-Leste's judicial system, even though it was still staffed and funded primarily by international practitioners. An unintended effect of this transfer of authority was that as the Timorese government sought to improve relations with Indonesia, the prosecutions of serious crimes lost necessary political support of the Indonesian government. The Timorese leadership objected to a critical arrest warrant issued in April 2004 against Indonesian general Wiranto. Claiming that reconciliation had been achieved, President Gusmão met the indicted general and the Timorese prosecutor-general did not forward the warrant to Interpol (the International Criminal Police Organization).

Parallel to the serious crimes process, in early 2002 UNTAET established a Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation (CAVR) with three main objectives: to investigate the facts about human rights violations committed in Timor-Leste between 1974 and 1999; to help reintegrate perpetrators of less-serious offenses into their communities; and to recommend measures to prevent future abuses to the government. The CAVR held a number of successful public hearings, took more than 7,000 statements from victims throughout the country, and presented its final report to then- President Gusmão in October 2005. He distributed it to the Timorese Parliament and prime minister in late November but did not publicly release it.

In December 2005 the president established a Technical Secretariat (the STP-CAVR) to complete the CAVR's publications work and disseminate its report. A limited program of dissemination and education has been carried out but has been constrained by lack of funds and the outbreak of violence in 2006. The Timorese Parliament has yet to consider the CAVR's report or begin implementing its recommendations, although plans for such a process are now being made.

The UN decided to shut down the serious crimes process in May 2005, despite the fact that many cases under investigation had not yet resulted in indictments, and the nascent Timorese judiciary probably would be unable and unequipped to deal with the complex cases the SCU left behind.

The governments of Indonesia and Timor-Leste have stated that their lack of interest in the serious crimes judicial process stems from the fact that it is an obstacle to their diplomatic relations. Instead, in December 2004 they agreed to establish a deeply flawed Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) whose terms of reference fail to protect victims' rights and fulfill state obligations to uncover the truth and promote accountability.

In February 2005 the UN established a Commission of Experts (COE) to examine and assess the progress of accountability processes for the crimes committed in 1999. The Commission's findings and recommendations were issued in May 2005, but the UN Security Council has not yet discussed them. The COE found that some of the Indonesian trials of perpetrators of the 1999 crimes were severely flawed and did not amount to genuine efforts to achieve accountability, and recommended new trials. The Commission also recommended that the serious crimes process be extended, and that the CTF's terms of reference be comprehensively reformed.

Despite these recommendations and the absence of any legislative authorization under Timorese or Indonesian law, the CTF commenced work according to its original terms of reference in August 2005. Between February and October 2007 the CTF held public hearings that were widely condemned for providing a platform for the self-serving testimony of accused perpetrators. Following two extensions of mandate by the presidents of Indonesia and Timor-Leste, the CTF was due to release its report in early February 2008. The report is now expected to be released in May 2008.

In August 2006 the Security Council decided to reopen the serious crimes process, including a Serious Crimes Investigation Team (SCIT). This team has a mandate only to conduct investigations into crimes committed in 1999. It is not a part of the Timor-Leste Prosecution Service and may not issue indictments. After prolonged delays in reaching an agreement with the Timor-Leste prosecutor-general's office for access to the SCU archive and case files, the SCIT finally started its investigative work in February 2008.

(Upadated May 2008)

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