

International Center
for Transitional Justice

Census and Identification of Security Personnel after Conflict

A TOOL FOR PRACTITIONERS, REVISED EDITION

Arezou Azad
Alexander Mayer-Rieckh
Serge Rumin

International Center for Transitional Justice

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About ICTJ

The International Center for Transitional Justice assists countries pursuing accountability for past mass atrocity or human rights abuse. ICTJ works in societies emerging from repressive rule or armed conflict, as well as in established democracies where historical injustices or systemic abuse remain unresolved.

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1. Introduction

In the aftermath of a conflict, a census and identification program (CIP) verifies membership within one or several security institutions, identifies their institutional boundaries, and helps ensure that individuals do not informally join or leave the institution(s). A CIP not only provides baseline data for personnel reform but also assists security institutions in consolidating control over their personnel, establishes the conditions to hold them accountable for their actions, and introduces a measure of public accountability by making security agents identifiable to the public. Governments in transition, United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations, and other post-conflict assistance programs are increasingly using CIPs in early post-conflict settings.

The first CIP of police personnel was carried out in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1999–2000 with UN peacekeeping assistance. Since then, similar programs—though different in scale—have been set up in Haiti, Liberia, and most recently in Burundi. The nature of a CIP allows it to be a useful tool to initiate security system reform (SSR) processes in early post-conflict settings.¹ However, the terms “census” and “identification” are often misunderstood; their relationship to other concepts, like “vetting,” “authorization,” and “certification” is often unclear; and no published document exists that explains the conceptual or operational modalities of a CIP in post-conflict settings.

It is hoped that this tool will fill the gap by explaining CIPs in a way that is useful for actors involved in SSR—governments in transitional contexts, multilateral and bilateral organizations, and civil society—and by providing practitioners the means to plan and implement such programs.

This tool contains three main sections. “General Overview” describes why it is important to undertake the census and identification of personnel in the context of SSR in post-conflict societies. “Setting the Framework” defines census and identification—its functions, challenges, actors, timeframe, ideal setting, and design. “Program Implementation” outlines how to prepare for a census and identification and how, based on lessons learned from previous experiences, a CIP should be implemented. In particular, its resourcing, preparation and testing, execution, outcomes and repercussions must be examined. The main points raised throughout the booklet are summarized and some key tools for practitioners are appended.

While a CIP may appear to be a purely technical process and a necessary prerequisite to the professionalization of one or several security institutions in post-conflict settings, the process of determining who is a member of a security institution and who is not may raise politically sensitive issues. For example, the ethnic balance of personnel within security institutions may have strong implications for the distribution of power and access to resources of different societal groups. A CIP must be planned and implemented with an awareness of the potential repercussions decisions like these may have.

1. For a comprehensive discussion of SSR and guidance on its implementation, see *The OECD Handbook on SSR: Supporting Security and Justice* (2007) at <http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/if-ssr>.

2. Rationale

2.1. What Are the Characteristics of an Early Post-Conflict Security System?

Generally, a high degree of uncertainty marks post-conflict situations; and often reliable information on the condition of the security system is unavailable. The security system constitutes a confusing multiplicity of armed individuals with loose ties to various security institutions. The boundaries of security institutions are fluid, while unofficial armed groups continue to operate and maintain informal links with them. It is not possible to know who is a member of any given institution and who is not. It is also not clear who is authorized to exercise force or who is illegally impersonating a security official. Moreover, the institutional boundaries may reflect loyalties to warring factions that serve the interests of a particular group, rather than the population as a whole. The potential for clashes between armed groups and regular institutions, or parts within them, remains high.

Within institutions, mandates are often unclear or inappropriate, and overlapping or non-complementary with other security institutions. In countries that enjoy peace and the rule of law, laws and statutes clearly delineate the mandates of security institutions; generally, law enforcement agencies provide public safety and defense institutions handle external threats. Citizens play an important role as partners and monitors of, and clients to, the security system. In countries emerging from conflict, on the other hand, the separation between law enforcement and defense institutions is less clear. Security officials linked to unofficial armed groups often retain unchecked power to act against their own citizens, resulting in continued oppression and violence. The lack of institutional integrity frequently continues into the post-conflict period, and the potential for abuse remains high.

Box 1: Addressing Uncertainty In Post-Conflict Contexts

Frequently conflicts not only entail a breakdown of institutions but also of formal processes. Record keeping is nonexistent or deficient, manipulated or abolished, and decisions are made informally without official notification. As a result, there is a high level of uncertainty in post-conflict contexts, and reliable information about the condition of the security system is unavailable. For example, the number, size, and organizational structure of security agencies and unofficial armed groups are unknown; the composition, employment status, and skill levels of security personnel are unidentified; and the conditions of the infrastructure and resources are elusive. In addition, the effective capacity of government actors to implement an SSR process is uncertain; they may lack actual control over the security system or the means to implement an SSR program.

Determining the level of uncertainty and establishing critical baseline data is, therefore, an important starting point for SSR in post-conflict contexts. Reform necessitates a clear understanding of the conditions of the security system. An effective SSR program will first determine

continue next page

the reliability and accuracy of the available data on the security system. If inadequacies are found, the program will undertake specific activities to obtain such data. These include mapping exercises, audits of security agencies and the census and identification of security personnel.

The members of security institutions frequently include perpetrators of past serious human rights violations. Citizens are painfully aware of such abuses and are often frustrated when perpetrators still exercise state-sanctioned power. Consequently, the public does not trust the security system—or parts of it—even after the conflict has ended. In addition, security officials often do not have the appropriate skills or equipment at their disposal to carry out their jobs properly. Compounding these factors, members of unofficial armed groups frequently continue to illegally impersonate security officials and commit crimes in the name of the state. Thus, in times of communal hardship, citizens may not turn to security institutions to resolve their conflicts but resort to informal methods of conflict resolution or even violence. Here again, the risk that violent conflict may recur between citizens and security officials, between security officials, or between citizens, is multiplied.

Box 2: The Haitian Police: How Many and Who Are They?

In April 2004, following the internal unrest and conflict in Haiti, the Security Council mandated the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) to assist the transitional government in reforming its national police. However, it quickly became apparent that credible sources on the number and composition of the police did not exist. Numbers varied between 2,000 and 6,000 officers. The situation was complicated when the transitional government decided to integrate former members of the military into the police service without proper screening or training. Moreover, unauthorized persons exercised police powers and impersonated police officers illegally.

The transitional government and MINUSTAH decided that a CIP was necessary. During 2005-6, MINUSTAH and the Haitian National Police registered and identified 5,783 police officers (including more than 1,000 new recruits). Once the newly elected government of Haiti was established in 2006, a reform plan for the Haitian National Police, and its vetting, was agreed and initiated. The police reform process could now get underway on the basis of a CIP that allowed the control and management of all staff and the identification of crucial training needs.

2.2. How Can a Census and Identification Program Contribute to Post-Conflict Security System Reform?


In order to establish a safe and secure environment for all citizens, the goals of post-conflict SSR are:

- A coherent architecture of the security system with effective governance and oversight structures (both for state and non-state security actors) and a manageable number of institutions with clearly defined mandates that do not overlap or create any functional gaps.
- Institutions that have the capacity to effectively deliver security, that have effective procedures to ensure organizational integrity (for example, internal disciplinary mechanisms), and that are transparent to the public they are called to serve.
- Personnel who are competent, have integrity, and enjoy public trust.

Each of the reform goals is contingent upon the existence of institutions that have defined membership. As mentioned above, post-conflict security institutions usually have fluid boundaries and determining membership is nearly impossible. Only once the institutional boundaries are closed and membership is established can an institution be managed and reformed effectively. A CIP does just that: *verify the current state of membership and close the institutional boundaries.*


A CIP produces reliable data that sheds light on the nature of the existing personnel structure. It provides information on who is a member of the concerned institution(s) and who is not, and supplies baseline data on the existing personnel. It creates a realistic and comprehensive framework for future personnel reform. In other words, a CIP lays out precise and verifiable facts on the *status quo*, and enables a reform process that is controlled, informed, and organized.

Situation of security institutions and their personnel unclear




1. Mapping of security institutions

Number, type and mandate of institutions clarified; institutions under scrutiny




2. Census and identification of security personnel

Number, type and status of personnel clarified; institutions under control



3. Training, vetting and restructuring

Personnel with minimum standards of integrity and competence; institutions functioning effectively and with integrity



In addition, a CIP constitutes a significant reform achievement in itself, and has a direct and positive effect on the functioning of the security system by:

- Assisting the state to consolidate its control over its security personnel. The security institutions and their agents can then be held responsible for their actions, and anyone impersonating a security agent illegally can be sanctioned.
- Identifying security personnel and making them recognizable to the public. The use of identity (ID) cards and the publication of CIP results are important public accountability measures.
- Enabling the security institution(s) to verify the payroll system. This mitigates internal corruption.

A CIP represents an important first step in establishing the rule of law and good governance.

2.3. How Can a CIP Ascertain Membership in a Security Institution?

A CIP is a means for effectively and accurately establishing membership in security institutions. A census and identification program:

- Registers and verifies the identity of the members of one or several security institution(s)
- Issues identity cards to all members, making them identifiable to their supervisors and the public

A CIP clarifies the number and status of all personnel in the targeted institution(s) and stops individuals from joining or departing from the institution(s) on an informal basis. The process should be comprehensive and inclusive, casting a wide net to capture all the people who present a reasonable claim for being employed by the security institution(s). Rapid establishment of control, not quality improvement, is the immediate goal of a CIP. No effective reform can be successfully put into place without control over the existing security institution(s). Control is not only a condition for reform then, but also a significant reform achievement in itself. A CIP should not be used as a simultaneous tool for instituting quality-enhancing measures, such as vetting, as that would significantly delay asserting control and perpetuate a situation of uncertainty and impunity. The piggybacking of other reform measures on a CIP would also increase the risk of failure of longer-term reform and undermine the program's short-term gains.

Put simply, a CIP is a one-off, *ad hoc* activity that responds to some immediate reform needs in a post-conflict context. It has a distinct beginning and should have a clear end. Once completed, the process should be formally closed.

After a CIP, a new era begins in which rules and procedures apply to a clearly defined group of personnel. From this point, anyone wanting to join an institution must follow the standard selection and recruitment procedures. The CIP outputs, particularly the personnel files of the institution's members, must be integrated into the regular—nascent or existing—personnel management system. This ensures the sustainability of the program and allows for a systematic and coordinated reform effort. After a CIP is completed, real reform can begin. For details on the CIP implementation process, see Section 5 below.

Box 4: The Census and Identification Program—What It Is and What It Is Not

- Status quo, not change
- Quick control and accountability, not quality improvement
- Foundation-setting, not “roof”-laying
- Comprehensive and inclusive, not selective and exclusionary
- *Ad hoc*, one-off, not regular personnel management

3. General Overview

3.1. Outputs: Results of a Census and Identification Program

3.1.1. A CIP ascertains the personal and professional situation of individual members in an institution. Each member has a personnel file with detailed information on training, professional experience (within and outside of the institution), and current work status; and each member is issued with a standardized ID card identifying him or her as a member.

3.1.2. A CIP produces accurate personnel statistics. These statistics can include total strength (see Box 2), and breakdowns by categories, such as professional grades, ethnic group, age, gender, level of qualification, residence, etc. These data facilitate realistic and effective personnel reform planning and management.

Box 5: The Census and Identification Program and Reform

A CIP is an important first step in establishing the rule of law and good governance.

A CIP produces facts that are necessary for a tailor-made and organized reform process:

- Personnel data on individual members
- Personnel statistics at the institutional level

A CIP is a reform achievement in itself, because it:

- Enables the state to control its security personnel
- Represents a condition for accountability
- Enables the identification of persons impersonating a security agent illegally
- Introduces a measure of transparency in personnel management
- Can help to empower citizens

3.2. Challenges: What to Consider When Planning a Census and Identification Program

In the planning stages, two important challenges must be taken into account:

3.2.1. Political sensitivity. Clarifying the management and distribution of personnel is sensitive in any kind of institution because it has serious implications for the individuals concerned and affects power balances. For example, a CIP may reveal that a particular group or faction is under-represented, or that a large proportion of the personnel is already past retirement age, or even that many names on the payroll are fictitious, thus pointing to corruption.

3.2.2. Operational complexity. A CIP requires significant human resources, diverse competencies, and logistical means allowing for operations on a grand scale to be carried out under reasonable conditions despite significant territorial constraints (e.g., large surface area, lack of infrastructure,

unfavorable weather conditions). Institutional reluctance to share accurate data, as well as pressures for the reform process to move forward and obtain fast results may exacerbate this challenge.

3.3. Actors: Who Is Directly Involved

The following list of actors serves as an example. Not all of these actors may be pertinent in every context and there may be other actors not listed here who are directly involved in another context.

3.3.1. Within governments and the public service:

- Government decision makers
- Members of parliament
- Staff within various ministries: defense, interior, public administration, finance
- Senior officers of the institution(s) concerned
- Dedicated personnel to manage and implement the CIP

3.3.2. Within peace operations:

- Police, military, human rights, political affairs, and rule-of-law personnel
- Administrative personnel
- Personnel working on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and on SSR

3.3.3. Other international organizations:

- Bilateral cooperation programs
- Multilateral institutions, including international financial institutions²
- Regional organizations
- International nongovernmental organizations that provide expertise and technical assistance

3.3.4. Domestic civil society:

- Relevant nongovernmental organizations and civil society actors (human rights organizations, unions, women's associations, etc.)
- Local opinion leaders
- Media professionals

3.3.5. Other coordination efforts that have, or will have, a role in the reform of the security system:

- Donor coordination group
- Rule-of-law forum
- Special contact group

2. International financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, are important interlocutors because they are frequently involved in establishing budget benchmarks and because structural adjustments to the budget often imply a reduction in the number of civil servants including security officials.

3.4. Activities: Who Does What

A CIP usually follows this action scheme (see also Box 9):

3.4.1. A **coordination unit** assists to establish a master list of reported personnel, identifies criteria for determining who is a member of the security institution and who is not, drafts operating procedures, and drafts an operational plan and budget.

3.4.2. A **steering committee** reviews and possibly amends, and endorses these documents.

3.4.3. **Census teams** tour all identified registration sites once all policy decisions have been reached and the operational framework has been set. They collect digital fingerprints, pictures, and personal data of all those claiming membership. The coordination unit validates the list of all confirmed members who will receive an ID card.

3.4.4. **Arbitration team(s)** process all contested and controversial cases, which may require the collection of additional information.

3.4.5. A **registry team** centralizes and processes all the files. All persons whose membership in the institution is confirmed are issued a professional ID card, a badge displaying his or her name, and an identification number affixed to the uniform. Data is stored in a central database and provides the baseline data for the regular personnel management system of the institution.

3.5. Sites: Where the Census and Identification Program is Carried Out

CIP activities occur at the headquarters of an institution and, where necessary, in the field. The decision making, management, and coordination of the program are held at headquarters. The activities in the field depend on the geographic spread of the targeted institution and the conditions of the infrastructure (roads, bridges, electricity supply, etc). For example, national police officers are usually spread throughout the country living and working anywhere from the capital to remote communities. This requires the CIP to operate throughout the territory. Smaller units, such as community-level police posts, could be assembled at district, region, commissariat, and other levels. In the case of the military the census locales would be fewer, given that the armed forces are usually grouped in closed barracks or cantonment sites.

3.6. Timing: When to Carry Out a Census and Identification Program, and How Long It Takes

A CIP should occur early in a transition, so it can inform and guide the reform process and so that the conditions for accountability are quickly established. Consider coordinating the start of a CIP with post-conflict consolidation of security institutions and armed groups of former warring

parties, and the DDR of former combatants. Such programs often involve the integration of demobilized fighters into the post-conflict security system, and a CIP should take this into account.

Experience has also shown that ideally a CIP should not be carried out in the middle of an electoral process, as elections divert significant resources and would dominate the attention of stakeholders at the expense of the CIP.

Even though a CIP is “merely” about registering and identifying personnel, it takes time. It is a particularly time-intensive activity for non-barracked, widely-dispersed institutions like a national police service. The duration of a CIP is generally underestimated and can vary depending on factors such as the size of the personnel, the geographic terrain, and the availability of resources. In general, it can be estimated that the planning and start-up of a CIP lasts a few months, and the execution takes between several weeks (in the case of a small-sized institution) and one year. The planning of a CIP needs to factor in possible delays prior to execution, particularly in the phase of negotiations on politically-sensitive membership criteria (see Sub-section 4.2.1. below).

Box 6: Case Study: Bosnia and Herzegovina—Timing is Not Everything

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was the site of the first CIP, and its lessons deserve close attention.

- *December 1995:* The Dayton Peace Accords established the framework for the mandate of the United Nations peace operation (UNMIBH) and its International Police Task Force (IPTF). The 2,000-strong international police mission was mandated to assist in the restructuring and reform of the police of the former warring parties into one or several police service(s) distributed across the new administrative entities—the Federation of BiH (Federation) and its cantons, the Republika Srpska (RS) and Brcko District.
- *August 1999:* IPTF inspections in police stations revealed that information provided by the cantonal and RS Ministries of the Interior on the numbers and composition of the police was highly inaccurate; and this hindered the reform effort. For example, the IPTF did not know whether the target strength of 20,000 officers had been reached or exceeded, or whether the quota for ethnic minority representation amongst the officers had been attained.
- *November 1999–October 2000:* An IPTF policy set the framework for a CIP. UNMIBH, together with the national authorities, registered 23,751 law enforcement agency personnel and issued ID cards to 16,803 officers authorized to exercise police powers. The personnel registry was computerized, thus enabling the production of demographic statistics, such as age pyramids, and data on ethnic background, provenance, skills training, etc.

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A systematic and comprehensive CIP came four years into the BiH's transition and consolidation of peace, but arguably the CIP should have started earlier. The good news is that when the CIP was eventually activated, it broke the stalemate of law enforcement reform in the BiH. After the CIP, managers could finally tailor recruitment activities to real needs, develop training programs that filled skills gaps, initiate vetting programs, and undertake other critical reform measures. Police officers were more readily held accountable, given that they were more easily identifiable to the public. There was less incentive to impersonate police officers illegally, since they were more recognizable and impersonators could be sanctioned more easily.

4. Setting the Framework

4.1. Context Analysis

4.1.1. Why is a context analysis important?

First, the context analysis provides an understanding of the institutional heritage that defines the principal direction of the reform. Second, a context analysis helps to assess whether the necessary conditions are met for engaging in a CIP, and if it is relevant and feasible. For example, a security institution may apply an age limit as a criterion for membership. The context analysis may reveal that this age limit will apply mostly to people from one of the former warring factions. This could seriously undermine the legitimacy and perceived independence of the CIP.

4.1.2. Who does the context analysis, and what are its main elements?

The assessment needs to be done in consultation with all major stakeholders, including government, civil society, the UN and other international organizations, foreign missions, and funding agencies. The context analysis does not need to be in-depth, but should provide a general sketch of the post-conflict security system and its environment. The following is a proposed list of elements that comprise a context analysis (not all elements are needed in every context):

4.1.2.1. Conflict History

- A brief overview of the conflict history and the role of the targeted institution(s) during and prior to the conflict
- An inventory of the existing security institutions and a brief profile of these institutions that may include name, estimated number of personnel and organizational structure
- An assessment of the level of uncertainty regarding the information available on the security system

4.1.2.2. Institutional Assessment

- The legal framework, such as, relevant domestic laws, peace agreement provisions, and UN Security Council resolutions
- The political framework, such as main national and international stakeholders, potential spoilers, “road map” for the transition, political power distribution, and major future political events
- The social and economic framework, such as employment rate, civil service salaries, and crime
- The main national and international (multilateral and bilateral) programs that may affect the targeted institution(s); most particularly, SSR and DDR programs, police reform, poverty reduction, civil service reforms, and governance
- The overall security situation

4.1.2.2. Main Challenges. The main challenges faced by the targeted institution(s) in the short, medium and long term, such as financial and logistical resource constraints, technology gaps, difficult terrain, and insecurity

4.1.2.2. Feasibility. Recommendations, justifications and options regarding the relevance and feasibility of a CIP

Box 7: Case Study: Liberia—Focus on the Entire System, Not Just One Institution

The 2003 Accra Peace Accords provided for the restructuring of the security system and the UN Security Council tasked the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) with assisting the transitional government in this process. Post-conflict Liberia inherited a highly complex, fragmented, and overstuffed security system. Multiple institutions with national jurisdiction operated alongside each other, in addition to local agencies and security units attached to government ministries and public corporations. Reliable information on the organizational structures and personnel strengths of these institutions was limited, and estimates of staffing levels varied significantly. Numerous security agents had been involved in serious human rights abuses during the conflict and others were recruited despite not meeting the requisite qualifications.

In 2004 UNMIL began to register the personnel of all security institutions in the country. When the mandate of the transitional government ended after presidential and legislative elections in late 2006, the UNMIL-assisted CIP registered 10,335 personnel from 14 out of 15 identified statutory law enforcement agencies, of which 3,742 were members of the national police. The CIP provided reliable information on the number of personnel and their profiles; on the size, composition and organizational structure of each agency; and on the overall architecture of the security system. The CIP revealed the need for a systemic approach to reform. Serious discussions about the comprehensive reform of the security system began following the inauguration of the newly elected government.

4.2. Designing the Program

Once a context analysis has occurred and the decision is made to go ahead with a CIP, the program needs to be defined and operationalized by a program strategy, an implementation structure, and an operational tool kit that includes procedures, timelines, and budgets.

4.2.1. Program Strategy

Before the program begins, a strategy document that sets the overall framework for the program needs to be discussed, agreed to, and endorsed at the highest political level. The strategy document can be formalized with an appropriate official memorandum, written declaration, or governmental decision. With a view to minimizing the potential for future disagreements, the document should be clear and sufficiently nuanced on sensitive issues. It should spell out, in particular, the:

4.2.1.1. Purpose of the census. The objective of a CIP is to determine membership. Through a registration and identification exercise, the program aims to *clarify who is a member of the institution(s) in question and who is not*. Additional information on educational and professional backgrounds and other personnel issues are collected, but these data are not considered when determining membership. They will rather serve as baseline data for later reform efforts, such as, training, downsizing, grade restructuring, vetting, etc. A CIP should not try to address personnel reform issues, such as rank structure or reporting lines, because attempting to do so would cause undue delays and may even paralyze the program.

4.2.1.2. Required proofs of identity. People claiming membership must present proofs of identity. Identity is a sensitive issue, and the strategy must spell out all acceptable and required proofs. In post-conflict contexts, personal identity cards are often missing or unreliable, and a CIP must seek alternative proofs of identity, such as birth certificates and witness statements by more than three community members.

4.2.1.3. Required proofs of membership. All proofs of membership must be defined and clearly outlined in the strategy. Generally, membership is proven if the claimant is on the master personnel list provided by the employing security institution (see Sub-section 4.3.1. below). In exceptional circumstances, alternative proofs of membership may be presented. These include work contracts submitted by the members of the institution, sign-in sheets that prove actual presence at work, activity reports and statements by colleagues attesting to the applicant's membership in the institution. The net should be cast widely to capture all the people who present a reasonable claim for being employed by the security institution(s).

4.2.1.4. Target group(s). It is important to decide on the target group from the beginning. Will the CIP target the personnel of one institution, or several? Will it target only uniformed personnel or also administrative staff that could be exercising considerable influence over uniformed personnel? Will the CIP also cover retired personnel who remain on the institution's payroll? For an example, see Box 7.


4.2.1.5. Implementation structure and operational tools. The implementation structure consists of the persons responsible for the program. It needs to be clear who manages the CIP, who handles the resources, and who oversees field operations. The operational tools that need to be drawn up are a set of procedures (on census and issuance of ID cards, handling of arbitration, and registry and archive management), an operational plan, a budget, and an *a priori* master personnel list (see Sub-section 4.3.1. below).

Box 8: Avoid Specifying Grade and Function on Professional ID Cards

Experience has shown that the ID cards issued during a CIP should not indicate the grades and functions of the security agents. The process of grade definition and allocation is complex; resolving it before issuing the new ID cards may delay the reform significantly. The delay may, in turn, result in arbitrary and controversial outcomes.

4.2.2. Implementation Structure

A representative implementation structure is critical for a successful CIP. Those who decide, manage, and implement a CIP should broadly represent the various constituencies of the post-conflict society in question including former warring factions and social groups (ethnic group, gender, etc.) that were marginalized during the conflict. Often, it is desirable that international actors advise and assist their national counterparts, and possibly monitor the implementation of the program. It may be necessary to employ interpreters to assist international actors. Involvement by international actors is likely to enhance the credibility of a CIP.



4.2.2.1. Policy level. The steering committee:

- Oversees program implementation and provides political support
- Reviews and endorses the operational plan, budget and procedures
- Supervises and supports the coordination unit
- Decides on contentious cases

Senior national officials should be nominated to the steering committee. The committee members should have access to strategic decision making and be available to attend regular meetings. Members should not come exclusively from the institution targeted by the CIP, but also from other institutions including other ministries or parliament. The size of the steering committee should remain manageable and the number of members should generally not exceed seven.

4.2.2.2. Management level. The coordination unit:

- Develops procedures, the operational plan, and the budget
- Mobilizes resources
- Organizes and supervises day-to-day activities
- Establishes a list of confirmed members who receive ID cards
- Executes the budget and manages the resources
- Keeps the steering committee informed of its activities on a regular basis
- Turns to the steering committee for guidance on questions of strategy

The coordination unit membership should be multidisciplinary, with competencies that include project management, legal affairs, political analysis, database management, logistics, and administrative support. It is recommended that the unit consist of around eight people.

4.2.2.3. Operational level. There are three types of field teams:

4.2.2.3.1. Census team(s) prepare and carry out the census and identification on the ground. They report to the coordination unit, and deploy staff on-site to conduct the census on a temporary basis. Each team may consist of five to ten people, and should have a team leader.

4.2.2.3.2. Arbitration team(s) review and prepare challenged cases by surveyed persons, and submit such cases to the steering committee for decision. The team(s) may consist of two or three people.

4.2.2.3.3. The **registry team** sets up and maintains the paper archives and personnel registry, which are subsequently backed up electronically. Given the sensitivity of these confidential data the team must ensure strict regulation of access. The team may consist of two or three people.

	LEVEL	BODY	TASK
SET UP	Political	Government, special commission, and/or relevant ministry; possibly high-level international representative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Define strategy • Establish implementation mechanism
	IMPLEMENTATION	Policy	Steering committee: senior national officials; possibly senior international officials (maximum 7 people)
Management		Coordination unit: program manager and multidisciplinary members; possibly international advisors and experts (maximum 8 people)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Design procedures, operational plan and budget • Mobilize resources • Organize and supervise day-to-day activities • Establish list of confirmed members • Execute budget
Operations		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Census team(s) (5-10 people each) • Arbitration team(s) (2-3 people each) • Registry team (2-3 people) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prepare and execute on-site activities • Manage personnel registry • Review contentious cases • Monitor compliance

4.3. Tools

4.3.1. Master personnel list. This is the cornerstone of any CIP. The list contains the names of people who are formally recognized by the relevant authorities as members of the institution(s). It is a snapshot of the entire personnel at one time, and, once endorsed, it cannot be changed in the course of the census. As such, it is the point of reference for the CIP. The list is generally compiled by the institution(s) in question and validated by the responsible minister and other relevant authorities (such as the CIP steering committee or other committees representing the parties to the relevant peace agreement). The master personnel list is not a gauge for competence or integrity. As mentioned above, a CIP clarifies and formalizes a person's membership status. In other words, a CIP ascertains whether someone is a member or not but does not determine whether someone possesses the competence or integrity to be a member.

4.3.2. Procedures. The work of the steering committee, the coordination unit, and the three types of field teams must be framed by respective rules and procedures. The coordination unit develops the rules and procedures, which are validated by the steering committee. Each set of procedures may include:

- A general description
- An overview of activities by phase (what to do)
- For each procedure, the actors implicated and their responsibilities, the place, the duration/frequency and resources needed (who, where, why and with which means to do it)
- Rules to follow (how to do it)

4.3.3. Operational plan. The plan is developed by the coordination unit. It outlines the sequencing of activities, and includes the following elements:

- Tactical approach includes site sequencing, or covering numerous sites simultaneously (depends on resources available)
- Details on activities, their duration, sites, and responsible actors

4.3.4. Budget. It is developed by the coordination unit, and should take into account the existing or likely available resources based on funds received or pledged. Breaking down the needs by programmatic stages may facilitate the budget-making process. The budget needs to be annotated in a way that it shows where resources—both in kind and in cash—have already been earmarked and who will provide the funds. The budget document should outline resource needs by types of expenses: human (members of the implementation structure outlined above, including administrative and translation support), capital investments (e.g., for the procurement of equipment), running costs (e.g., rental of premises, transport, equipment maintenance, fuel) and program support costs.

5. Program Implementation

5.1. Resource Mobilization

With the support of the steering committee, the coordination unit should be in charge of mobilizing resources. For a better understanding of the kind of resources needed to implement a CIP see the checklist in Annex 1. The budget (see Sub-section 4.3.4. above) should identify clearly where there is a shortfall that requires further resource mobilization.

Box 11: Coordination with DDR and Other Programs

If a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program exists in the country, demobilized soldiers and other combatants who received a package for their reintegration should not become members of a security institution, unless a special policy indicates otherwise. It is important to cross reference data from the DDR program with the CIP. A similar provision may be necessary with electoral data, because security agents usually are not allowed to run for election unless stated otherwise in relevant laws. Relevant databases should, therefore, be obtained and cross-referenced.

5.2. Pilot Test and Census Preparation

5.2.1. Pilot. Before any large-scale CIP operation can begin, its operational tools need to be tested and, if necessary, revised and the tools revalidated by the steering committee. The pilot sample must be representative of national realities and large enough to render meaningful results. The pilot should try to account for operational differences between urban and rural settings.

5.2.2. Census form. Each individual surveyed has to fill out one census form (see sample form in Annex 2). Its design should reflect the specifications in the program strategy on the proofs of identity, proofs of membership, etc. The census form captures the following data:

- Programming details, including place of census, date of census, census team number, and name of team supervisor
- Personal details, such as:
 - Identity (name and identification number), place and date of birth, marital status
 - Position, such as the administrative unit he or she is attached to
 - Education and training
 - Professional experience
 - Conflict-period assignments
- References (minimum of three names)

- Statement signed by claimant and a witness confirming the authenticity of information provided
- Receipt proving that the claimant has undergone the census and identification

In its layout the form should include:

- Fields such as “date” and “place” that are clearly referenced (e.g., “date of census”, “date of birth” or “date of assignment”). This minimizes uncertainties later on when the information is being entered into an electronic database.
- In the footer field, a reference on the date of the last modification of the form, the form version number, the file status (ongoing or final), and page numbers in relation to a total page count. This should reduce errors in data processing.
- Each section and field should be numbered (e.g., 1 – Marital Status, 2 – Education, etc.)

Box 12: The Identification Number

The identification number is a number assigned to each individual completing a census form. It allows the unambiguous identification of one individual among a pool of others. Experience has shown that using the first name(s) and surname(s) of an individual to identify him or her is not enough. In many countries, people frequently have the same names. Thus, the most efficient solution to manage a CIP database is to use a serial number as a unique identifier.

5.3. Execution of Census and Identification

In an ideal scenario, the census and identification follows the following scheme:

5.3.1. Short-term operational planning. The plan outlines the short-term details of the operations, e.g., the sequencing of regions and headquarters-based units, either consecutively or simultaneously.

5.3.2. Team set-up. Field teams are set up and trained on operational procedures. Lessons learned from the pilot census are shared. In addition, a focal point in each regional headquarters or at a special unit of the institution is identified and briefed. The focal point assists the census team in preparing and coordinating the census on the ground.

5.3.3. Official launch. This is an important opportunity for communicating to the public. It raises awareness of the program and its consequences, and thus, manages the expectations of the public. The targeted institution should play a proactive and visible role during the launch.

5.3.4. Pre-visit and site preparation. A number of census team members should visit the site prior to operations to meet local authorities. They will coordinate with the on-site focal point, train the counterparts who will assist in the census, assess logistical constraints, ensure that people expected to appear for the census have been informed and that groups are sequenced in such a way that the CIP does not cause undue ruptures in safety and security service delivery.

5.3.5. Resource deployment. Computers are fitted with the necessary software and database tools. The material and equipment needed for the census are placed on site in good time to avoid later delays. For instance, it may be necessary to vacate and prepare a building for the census days in advance.

5.3.6. Census. In general, census activities proceed with:

- A session opening
- A briefing of persons to be registered
- Identity verification
- Form completion
- Monitoring of form completion and signing-up in a registration book
- Verification of membership (i.e. against master personnel list)
- Validation, rejection, litigation (on-site or at headquarters)
- Entry of census form data into electronic database (on-site or at headquarters)

The level of literacy of the persons to be registered is considered in the planning of the census. Illiterate persons will require assistance in filling out the data form, which is time consuming and resource intensive.

5.3.7. Delivery of professional ID cards and badges. This occurs once the form has been checked and membership validated by the coordination unit, an ID card has been printed, and the recipient has signed a confirmation of receipt. There are two options for delivering ID cards.

The two-step approach is to return to headquarters to process the forms, and then deliver the cards.

The advantages of this approach are that:

- Membership decisions are made off-site in a more secure environment
- The second visit allows for closer contact with the security personnel

The disadvantages are that:

- It takes more time, resources, and effort to contact the personnel and visit their gathering locales a second time

The one-step approach is to process the files, validate membership and issue the ID card on site.

The advantages are that it:

- Avoids a second visit
- Saves time and resources

The disadvantages are that it:

- May involve decisions that go beyond the scope of the census team's mandate
- Puts the census team in an undue decision-making position that may entail security risks
- Requires a high level of organization and more logistics on-site
- Will not avoid delays caused by arbitration cases

At the time the ID cards are issued, registered persons whose membership could not be verified are officially notified in writing about the reasons for their rejection.

5.3.8. Display of ID cards. After the ID cards have been issued, the personnel of the security institution(s) are obliged to carry their card at all times while on duty. If they do not openly display their card, personnel should be willing to present it on demand. Badges, however, which are less fragile than cards, must always be displayed. The card indicates the surname and first name of the agents, and the identification number that was issued when they received their new ID card. A sample ID card is attached in Annex 3.

5.3.9. Storage of data and forms. A storage system is put in place at the site where the personnel registry is located. The method of organization accounts for the need to manage a large number of forms with multiple pages. Precautions should be taken to avoid losses in the transfer of forms to the registry storage site, and each package of forms should be labeled with the site of origin. Security must be ensured during the entire census and storage process.

5.3.10. Follow-up sessions for absentees. It is usually not possible for all persons to be registered to appear on one given date, even if arrangements were made in advance. Absenteeism due to being on duty, sickness or holidays is inevitable. The problem of absences is built into the operational plan by planning for follow-up census visits.

5.3.11. Handling of litigious cases. A person who has been rejected may appeal and request a re-examination of his or her case by the arbitration team. In such cases, he or she presents complementary proofs of membership. The final decision of the steering committee is communicated officially to the person concerned, and is registered in a litigation file. The personnel registry is updated if the census rejection is overturned in the person's favor.

5.4. Outputs and Consolidation

5.4.1. Personnel registry. The personnel registry consists of all personnel forms and data collected by the end of the census. It will be used as a reference for the future management and reform of the institution's personnel (e.g., vetting, training, and promotion). It replaces the master personnel list drawn up prior to the CIP (see Sub-section 4.3.1. above). The registry represents the nucleus of a personnel management system and must be updated in real time. The management

of documents related to the personnel registry must be formalized. Access should be limited, and the confidentiality of the data respected. Older personnel archives, should they exist, must be merged with the personnel registry.

An electronic database of the personnel registry is desirable but not necessary for the CIP to proceed. Only data management professionals should set up an electronic version. Not all the information provided in the census form needs to be entered; the focus should be on data that can render statistical information. The electronic database should have no more than 15-20 fields, and it should be compatible with other information systems. For initial purposes, a spreadsheet program may be more than sufficient. Access to the electronic personnel registry must be limited, and modifications to it clearly safeguarded.

The database system used for the CIP should be as simple as possible, since it only aims to manage the ID cards. Nevertheless, it is critical to ensure the sustainability of the CIP and allow for its integration into a future personnel management system. Measures are instituted early on to allow for the later upgrading of the registry system. This will be required for building a proper personnel management system. Such efforts include:

- Ensuring adequate resources for the maintenance of the registry
- Designing and implementing a global personnel management system
- Building personnel management capacity at the institution

Box 13: Data Entry Is Time Consuming

If data entry for one census form takes five minutes; and if one data operator processes 100 forms per work day; and if the CIP is targeting 20,000 personnel, then it will take 200 work days (or 40 weeks) for one operator to process the forms. Therefore, adequate resources need to be made available to complete a CIP in a reasonable time frame.

5.4.2. Final report and official closure. The end of the CIP is marked by the completion of the official personnel list and the publication of a final report. After this, no further changes can be made to the registry, and all future updates may only be made through the regular personnel management system according to standard recruitment, promotion, and dismissal procedures.

Given that the census is an *ad hoc* activity, it needs to be closed officially once completed. Three important outcomes or messages that need to be delivered are:

- The total strength of the institution is now officially known
- Anyone whose membership has not been validated, but who wants to join the institution, needs to go through the regular and formal selection and recruitment process, i.e. joining or departing from the institution informally is not possible anymore

- Anyone giving the appearance of being a member of the security institution whose membership has not been validated in the CIP, or who has not been recruited formally subsequent to the CIP, is exercising official powers illegally and may be subject to sanction

5.4.3. Public information and civil society. As mentioned in Section 2 above, one of the main goals of SSR is to reshape the relationship between the public and the security system to one of partnership between client and provider respectively. A CIP sets the foundation for reform and makes the first step in fostering this type of relationship by:

- Raising the awareness of civil society of the public's right to know who is serving in the security system
- Providing an opportunity to bring a public face to the security system's leadership
- Informing the public, in particular civil society actors, of the proper display of ID cards and of how to report irregularities

5.4.4. Verification of census implementation. A small team of the institution's personnel department (possibly with international assistance) should check on an ongoing basis that people present in the institution have been registered and that persons rejected are not continuing to work. Any irregularities should be reported to the leadership of the institution. The team should also follow up on actions taken to rectify membership irregularities.

5.5. Repercussions: After the Census

The final census and identification report comprises the basic information for all future personnel reform and management efforts. In other words, the closure of the program is the beginning of the real reform phase. It assists in defining the needs and priorities for important reform processes such as:

- **Reorganization.** It provides information on categories of personnel, functional and geographic units, the representation of ethnic groups, gender representation etc., which enable the setting of real targets for downsizing or increasing total personnel strength.
- **Training.** It allows a comprehensive assessment of existing skills and training needs and the design of tailor-made training programs.
- **Vetting.** It provides background information on the conflict history of each member of the security institution, and constitutes one of the basic sources of information for an eventual vetting program.
- **Selection and recruitment.** It helps to identify additional personnel needs.
- **Management.** A proper personnel management system can be put in place, including elements such as a payroll; schemes for tasking and assignments, and for staff promotions, benefits and pensions; disciplinary measures; and demographic statistics.

6. Concluding Remarks

The census and identification of security personnel forms a critical foundation for reform in the aftermath of conflict because it establishes membership, prevents individuals from joining or departing from the security institution(s) on an informal basis, and thus, defines the boundaries of the security system and its institutions. A CIP makes reform processes more effective, controlled and sustainable by solidifying the boundaries of an institution.

A CIP requires, like any large-scale program, a strategy agreed at the highest political level, a program structure at three levels (policy, management, and operations) and a set of procedures, plans, and budgets. A CIP is resource intensive but generates substantial institutional reform gains. Program staff must be an interdisciplinary team, with experts from various fields, such as security, management, politics, law, and data management. The final outcome of a CIP is a personnel registry, which forms the nucleus of a proper personnel management system and of all future reform activities, including recruitment of new staff, dismissals, retirements, and training.

A CIP establishes the conditions for accountability and provides a solid foundation for post-conflict SSR. It is hoped that this tool will be useful for practitioners who engage in a CIP, and that it helps them in advancing security and the rule of law in post-conflict societies.

ANNEX 1: CHECKLIST OF CIP MATERIALS

Office space

- Large safe room to archive materials
- Large room to process files

Vehicles

- Minibus (to transport CIP personnel)
- 4x4 pick-up truck (to transport material)

Photocopier

- High-capacity photocopier for census forms
- Simple photocopier for program administration

Computers

- Laptops, desktops
- Printers
- Fingerprint digitalizing equipment
- Digital camera

Communication

- Mobile phones
- “Walky-talky” radios (for remote areas)

Office supplies

- One logbook per institution (can be designed on computer and printed)
- Stamps and ink
- “CIP” blue or red ink
- “Date” blue or red ink
- Large amount of paper (forms, receipts, other)
- Pens, cardboard file covers, tapes, staplers, markers, scissors, etc.
- Whiteboards (in the office and to advertise during registration)
- Paper boxes (to process files)

Identification

- ID cards
- ID card printer (films, cartridges)
- Clips/chains to attach ID cards
- Badges
- Badge engraving device
- White or blue curtain for the picture background

Furniture

- Filing cabinet and lockers
- 1-2 large desks to process files (screening, sorting, etc.)
- Regular desks, chairs, benches
- Boxes to transport files

Material to conduct census in rural areas with limited infrastructure

- Chairs, desks, and benches (for the team and persons completing the forms)
- Generator, lamps, electric cables, and fan/heater (for staff spending all day in the registration room or tent)
- Plastic sheeting, wire or tents
- Tape to organize the queue, etc.

ANNEX 2: SAMPLE DATA FORM



Institution logo

Institution name

DATA FORM							
Census No. <table border="1"> <tr> <td>□</td> <td>□</td> <td>□</td> <td>□</td> <td>□</td> <td>□</td> </tr> </table>	□	□	□	□	□	□	Date of Census: ____ / ____ / ____ dd/mm/yyyy Place of Census: _____
□	□	□	□	□	□		

A. PERSONAL INFORMATION

A.1 Family / Last Name

A.2 Given / First Name

A.3 Date of Birth: ____ / ____ / ____
 dd/mm/yyyy

A.4 Place of Birth: _____ / _____ / _____
 County District Village

(Note: Administrative units may vary across countries, but should always go down from regional to local level. Claimants filling the form must be precise.)

A.5 Place of Origin: _____ / _____ / _____
 County District Village

(Note: "Place of origin" and "place of birth" can mean different things in some countries.)

A.6 Ethnic Group:

(Note: relevance of inserting this sensitive field depends on context)

A.7 Citizenship: Domestic Other: _____

A.8 Gender: Male Female

A.9 Marital status: Married Single Widow Divorced

A.10 Father's Surname

Father's Given / First Name

A.11 Mother's Surname

Mother's Name

Is on master list <input type="checkbox"/> YES/ <input type="checkbox"/> NO	Is 18 years old <input type="checkbox"/> YES/ <input type="checkbox"/> NO	Has citizenship <input type="checkbox"/> YES/ <input type="checkbox"/> NO
Overall status _____		

Comment: To increase the performance while processing the files, the above tick box is useful. It recapitulates on the front page the status of all the fields being considered to ascertain belonging to the institution and allows identifying the status of the files at a glance.

TO BE FILLED OUT BY CENSUS AGENT

Last update: dd/mm/yyyy

Version No.: n

Page 1

Census No.:

A.12 Current Contact Address

_____	_____
Street	Town
_____	()
Country	Current Contact Tel No

B. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

B.1 List your professional occupation(s) between dd/mm/yyyy and dd/mm/yyyy.

(Note: Specific dates that may be relevant to the census are context-specific.)

From ____ / ____ / ____ To ____ / ____ / ____ Location _____
Professional Occupation _____

From ____ / ____ / ____ To ____ / ____ / ____ Location _____
Professional Occupation _____

From ____ / ____ / ____ To ____ / ____ / ____ Location _____
Professional Occupation _____

B.2 List three persons (full names and full contact address/telephone), not related to you, who can confirm the information stated above.

Person 1: Family Name: _____ Given/ First Name: _____

Tel _____

Full Address (incl. top/down territorial/administrative divisions, e.g., county, district, village):

Person 2: Family Name: _____ Given/ First Name: _____

Tel _____

Full Address: _____


Person 3: Family Name: _____ Given/ First Name: _____

Tel _____

Full Address: _____

B.3 Have you ever been arrested, indicted, or summoned into court as a defendant in a criminal proceeding, or convicted, fined or imprisoned for the violation of any law (excluding traffic violations)?

Yes No



TO BE FILLED OUT BY CENSUS AGENT

Last update: dd/mm/yyyy

Version No.: n

Page 2

Census No.:

C. EDUCATION

- C.1** Did you complete your primary school? Yes No
If yes, name of school _____
- C.2** Did you complete your secondary school? Yes No
If yes, name of school _____
- C.3** What is the highest level of education you completed?
Secondary University Specify _____
- C.4** Are you in possession of your diploma? Yes No

D. MILITARY EXPERIENCE

- D.1** Did you occupy any military position during the war? Yes No
From ____ / ____ / ____ To ____ / ____ / ____
Unit _____ Rank _____

E. POLICE OR OTHER SECURITY WORK EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION

- E.1** Do you work as a police officer/security agent now? Yes No
What is your current assignment (position) _____
Rank _____ Station/Substation _____
- E.2** Did you take an oath? Yes No
- E.3** Do you usually wear a uniform while on duty? Yes No
- E.4** Do you have a side arm assigned to you? Yes No
- E.5** Are you authorized to arrest or detain persons? Yes No
- E.6** What level of police or security education have you attained? (*Check all that apply*)
Police or other security high school
Police or other security academy
Other police or security course (*e.g., within your ministry or institution*)
Please specify _____
- E.7** Did you have other assignments within the police/institution before the current one?
Yes No
If yes, please list them:
- a) Previous Assignment (position) _____ Rank _____
Station/Substation: _____ / _____
From: ____ / ____ / ____ To: ____ / ____ / ____

TO BE FILLED OUT BY CENSUS AGENT

Last update: dd/mm/yyyy

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Page 3

Census No.:

b) Previous Assignment (position) _____ Rank _____

Station/Substation: _____ / _____

From: ____ / ____ / ____ To: ____ / ____ / ____

c) Previous Assignment (position) _____ Rank _____

Station/Substation: _____ / _____

From: ____ / ____ / ____ To: ____ / ____ / ____

d) Previous Assignment (position) _____ Rank _____

Station/Substation: _____ / _____

From: ____ / ____ / ____ To: ____ / ____ / ____

E.8 Were you ever subject to an internal investigation during your work?

Yes No

STATEMENT

I hereby certify that all the information given in this form is true, complete and correct to the best of my knowledge. I understand that any misrepresentation of, or material omission from, this form will invalidate eligibility for membership of the (institution name).

Signature

Date (day / month / year)

Fingerprint

CHECKED BY CENSUS AGENT: _____

Name/surname

Agent Census No. _____

Date of census: dd/mm/yyyy

Signature _____

.....
TO BE FILLED OUT BY CENSUS AGENT

Last update: dd/mm/yyyy



Version No.: n

Page 4


Census No.:

ANNEX 3: SAMPLE IDENTITY CARD

ID Card: Front Side



ID Card: Back Side





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ICTJ New York

5 Hanover Square, 24th Fl.

New York, NY 10004

Tel +1 917 637 3800

Fax +1 917 637 3901

www.ictj.org