FORGOTTEN VOICES
A POPULATION-BASED SURVEY ON ATTITUDES
ABOUT PEACE AND JUSTICE IN NORTHERN UGANDA

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Front cover: Residents of Amida camp for internally displaced persons near Kitgum, Northern Uganda. Most of those pictured have had their homes destroyed and possessions taken by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Many have also had loved ones murdered or children abducted by the LRA. March 2005. Photos by Thomas W. Morley / Exile Images.

Above: These four residents of the Ngomorroeo camp for internally displaced persons, located near the Sudanese border in Northern Uganda, were attacked and mutilated by the LRA after they left the relative safety of the camp to fetch water. March 2005. Photos by Thomas W. Morley / Exile Images.
Forgotten Voices

A Population-Based Survey of Attitudes about Peace and Justice in Northern Uganda

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Executive Summary

For nearly two decades, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has waged a war against the people of Northern Uganda. Known for its extreme brutality, LRA fighters have killed and mutilated countless civilians and abducted tens of thousands of children and adults to serve as soldiers and sex slaves for its commanders. The group’s conflict with government forces has received little international attention, even though as many as 1.6 million civilians have been displaced and now languish in dozens of squalid camps throughout the countryside.

The Ugandan government has pursued a dual approach of military action and mediation to bring peace to the region. So far, neither initiative has succeeded. In December 2003, President Museveni referred the situation in Northern Uganda to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which is expected to issue indictments shortly against several top LRA leaders.

This move—and the way forward in the north—has sparked an intense, and often acrimonious, debate within Ugandan civil society and the international community. On one side, it is argued that the ICC’s intervention will prolong the conflict and undermine peace talks between the LRA and the government’s mediator, Betty Bigombe, as well as other local initiatives, such as the work of the Amnesty Commission or the exploration of using traditional methods to deal with past crimes. On the other side, proponents of the ICC argue that pursuing peace at the expense of justice is not a viable long-term option, and that the Court’s activities in Uganda have already drawn greater international and regional attention to the conflict and put pressure on both sides to resolve it.

In recent years, several researchers have conducted qualitative studies of the factors influencing peace and justice considerations in the north, primarily comprising interviews with Ugandan government officials, humanitarian workers, traditional and religious leaders, former LRA members, and others. These studies have contributed greatly to our understanding of the challenges policymakers face in their efforts to end 19 years of war. Yet, most research has not included population-based data that represent the spectrum of attitudes and opinions of those most affected by the violence. This report seeks to fill that void.

The report is based on the preliminary analysis of quantitative data collected from interviews with 2,585 residents of four northern districts—Gulu and Kitgum (both Acholi districts), and Lira and Soroti (both non-Acholi districts). The interviews were conducted by teams of trained interviewers led by researchers from the Human Rights Center (HRC), University of California, Berkeley, in partnership with the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). Makerere University Institute of Public Health partnered with UC Berkeley on two of the districts. The interviews took place between April 20 and May 2, 2005, using a structured questionnaire.
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The minimum target sample size per district was approximately 500 respondents—all of whom were selected through a geographic multistage stratified cluster sampling technique. Three teams of 22 to 24 local interviewers, fluent in the local languages, conducted the interviews. The Institute of Public Health at Makerere University assisted in the formation of the teams in Soroti and Lira. In Gulu and Kitgum, a selection was made from a list of local interviewers who had previously worked with other organizations. Each team reflected the ethnic composition of the district. Prior to the launch of the survey, the instrument was extensively piloted and adjusted. The resulting structured questionnaire used an open-ended questions format. Response options were given to facilitate the interviewer’s recording of the responses. Finally, the data was entered and analyzed using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software version 13.0.

The specific objectives of the survey were to:

1. Measure the overall exposure to violence as a result of war and human rights abuses in Northern Uganda since 1987;
2. Understand the immediate needs and concerns of residents of towns, villages, and internally displaced person (IDP) camps in Northern Uganda;
3. Capture opinions and attitudes about specific transitional justice mechanisms, including trials, traditional justice, truth commissions, and reparations; and

These are some of the main conclusions of the research:

- **The levels of exposure to violence in Northern Uganda are extremely high.** The people of Northern Uganda have been exposed to an extremely high level of violence. Of the 2,585 respondents, 40 percent had been abducted by the LRA, 45 percent had witnessed the killing of a family member, and 23 percent had been physically mutilated at some point during the conflict. The extent and nature of the violence will require a variety of mechanisms to be implemented as part of a transitional justice strategy for Northern Uganda. For example, a majority of respondents (81 percent) said they wanted to speak publicly about what had happened to them, and many supported reparations measures for victims.

- **Immediate needs and concerns include peace and food.** Survey respondents named the availability of food (34 percent) and a sustained peace (31 percent) as their top priorities.

- **Peace and justice are not seen as mutually exclusive.** Respondents viewed peace and justice as a complex relationship that was not necessarily mutually exclusive. Indeed, given the opportunity, many would like to have both. About three-quarters (76 percent) of the respondents said that those responsible for abuses should be held accountable for their actions. When respondents were asked whether they would accept amnesty if it were the only road to peace, 29 percent said no. Respondents also noted that the Ugandan government and the
international community were key actors in the areas of peace, accountability, and justice.

- **Accountability for crimes committed by all sides is a priority.** When asked how they wanted to deal with the LRA, respondents fell along a spectrum, favoring options ranging from punishment (trial, imprisonment, killing, 66 percent), to forgiveness, reconciliation, and reintegration (22 percent), to confronting and/or confessing to the community (2 percent) and granting compensation to victims (1 percent). Most respondents (76 percent) said that UPDF members should be held accountable for their crimes.

- **The amnesty process is supported, but should be reformed.** Sixty-five percent of respondents support the amnesty process for LRA members. However, only 4 percent said that amnesties should be granted unconditionally, and the vast majority noted that some form of acknowledgement and/or retribution should be required of all those granted amnesty.

- **Traditional and formal justice mechanisms (including the ICC) are poorly understood.** Thirty-six percent of respondents said that the national court system was the most appropriate institution to deal with human rights abuses in Northern Uganda. Knowledge of traditional justice ceremonies was markedly higher in Acholi areas (55 percent) than in non-Acholi areas (19 percent). The majority of respondents (73 percent) knew nothing or very little about the ICC’s existence and work. Of those who had heard of the Court, a majority attached high expectations to it, believing that the ICC would contribute both to peace (91 percent) and justice (89 percent).

Peace and justice will be achieved in Northern Uganda only through an inclusive process that involves a wide range of stakeholders, including victims, bystanders, and perpetrators. This requires consulting widely and broadly on the feasibility and applicability of transitional justice measures and, most of all, giving those most affected by the violence a voice in the process.

The peace-versus-justice debate in Northern Uganda has become unnecessarily polarized over the controversy surrounding the ICC, and is often put into stark terms of false alternatives between peace and justice. Indeed, the way forward in Northern Uganda should be driven by a comprehensive strategy that integrates the strengths of all mechanisms—formal and traditional—aimed at bringing peace and justice to the region.

To this end, the report concludes with the following recommendations:

1. **To the International Community:** Facilitate a series of meetings involving local, national, and international stakeholders to develop an integrated and comprehensive strategy for peace and justice in Northern Uganda. A real danger exists that the current debate of peace versus justice will revert into one of competing, alternative options that divides talents and resources, rather than uniting them around a set of common goals. This demonstrates the need for enhanced dialogue between stakeholders and, potentially, a series of meetings. The mechanisms currently suggested are likely to function simultaneously, and an
integrated approach will be needed to ensure their complementarity. There is also a need to conduct further population-based surveys in Northern Uganda to determine how attitudes about peace and justice evolve over time. The international community should support further initiatives.

2. To the Ugandan Government: Reform the amnesty process so that it is more inclusive and better meets victims’ expectations. Survey respondents expressed a level of support for the work of the Amnesty Commission, but they also said some form of acknowledgement and/or retribution—confessing wrongdoing, apologizing to the victims and the community, punishment, and/or compensation to victims—should be required of those granted amnesty. These elements are key to successfully reintegrating former LRA members into the community. The amnesty process could be expanded to include truth-telling mechanisms, measures for commemoration of victims, and reparations for harm suffered.

3. To Local Leaders: Increase consultation capabilities so that the views and opinions of constituents can be better integrated into policies aimed at achieving peace and justice. The research indicates that there is public support for certain local initiatives, such as the amnesty process. However, views on the suitability of traditional justice ceremonies for dealing with violations committed by the LRA are less sanguine. Local leaders have a crucial role to play in guiding the process of peaceful reintegration of postwar communities, but they must do so in close consultation with their constituencies.

4. To the International Criminal Court: Implement an outreach strategy that fosters greater awareness among Ugandans of the court’s mandate and mode of operations. This effort should aim to disseminate more information about the Court and engage the public in dialogue. Such a strategy should also seek to manage the expectations of victims, many of whom believe the ICC can deliver more than it is able. As part of such a strategy, the Court should establish a presence in the North so that people will have regular access to ICC staff. Finally, the ICC should consider holding trials in situ to increase public access to its proceedings.
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Introduction

For nearly two decades, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has waged a war against the people of Northern Uganda. Known for its extreme brutality, LRA fighters have killed and mutilated civilians and abducted tens of thousands of children and adults to serve as load carriers, soldiers, and sex slaves for its commanders. The group’s conflict with government forces has received little international attention, even though as many as 1.6 million civilians have been displaced and now languish in dozens of squalid camps throughout the countryside. One camp, holding nearly 64,000 people, used to sprawl for miles. Food, clean water, and medical care are scarce. Malnutrition and diseases such as malaria, scabies, and tuberculosis are rampant. LRA rebels or government soldiers often attack those who leave the camps to search for food.

The Ugandan government has used a dual approach of military action and mediation with the LRA in an attempt to bring peace to the region. Since 1986, the government has launched six military operations of varying success and, in 1994, began formal peace talks with LRA leader Joseph Kony. In December 2003, President Museveni referred the situation in Northern Uganda to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which is expected shortly to issue indictments against several top LRA leaders. This move—and the way forward in the north—has sparked an intense, and often acrimonious, debate within Ugandan civil society and the international community. On one side, it is argued that the ICC’s intervention will undermine peace talks taking place between the LRA and the government’s mediator, Betty Bigombe, as well as other local initiatives to bring about peace. On the other side, proponents of the ICC argue that pursuing peace without justice is not a viable long-term option, and that the Court’s presence in Uganda has had “a positive impact, facilitating prospects for realizing sustainable peace, primarily by drawing greater international attention to the conflict and pressuring conflicting parties to resolve it.”

In recent years, several researchers, in an effort to understand the complexities of achieving a lasting peace in the north, have conducted qualitative studies, consisting primarily of interviews with Ugandan government officials, humanitarian workers, and traditional and religious leaders, former LRA, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and victims. These studies have contributed greatly to policy discussions and our understanding of the challenges policymakers face in their efforts to end 19 years of war. Yet the research has not typically included population-based data that represents the

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1 Pabbo camp has now been divided into several smaller camps.
2 Uganda became a State Party on June 12, 2002.
3 These include an initiative to extend amnesty to former LRA members, as well as exploring traditional mechanisms for their reintegration into social life.
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spectrum of attitudes and opinions of those most affected by the violence. This report seeks to fill that void.

The report is based on the preliminary analysis of data collected between March and May 2005 by a team of researchers dispatched to Northern Uganda by the Human Rights Center (HRC), University of California, Berkeley, and the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). During the mission, researchers consulted with representatives of the Ugandan government, leaders of civil society, and representatives of local and international nongovernmental organizations in the capital, Kampala, and the northern towns of Gulu and Lira. The qualitative assessment was followed from April 20 to May 2 by a quantitative survey of 2585 residents of four northern districts—Gulu, Kitgum, Lira, and Soroti—using a structured questionnaire. The Acholi, from Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader districts, are the main victims of the conflict, but communities in the surrounding districts of Lira and Soroti have been dramatically affected, as well.

The specific objectives of the survey were to:

1. Measure the overall exposure to violence as a result of war and human rights abuses in Northern Uganda since 1987;
2. Understand the immediate needs and concerns of residents of towns, villages, and IDP camps in Northern Uganda;
3. Capture opinions and attitudes about specific transitional justice mechanisms, including trials, traditional justice, truth commissions, and reparations; and

Societies emerging from periods of war or political violence or political repression can deal with the past in a number of ways. They can pursue criminal trials, implement traditional justice mechanisms, establish truth commissions, initiate vetting and lustration programs to remove past offenders from the public sector, distribute reparations for victims, and institute legal and institutional reforms to conform to international standards of human rights. All of these activities comprise the main components of transitional justice, and experiences in other countries around the world have shown that these mechanisms should be combined within a comprehensive strategy. Yet for such mechanisms to be effective, they must meet four criteria.

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6 The respondents were selected using a geographic multistage stratified cluster sampling technique.


8 For information on transitional justice initiatives in other countries, see www.ictj.org.
First, it is imperative that the wider population views the implementing authorities as both legitimate and impartial. Second, such measures should be selected through a genuine process of consultation with those most affected by the violence. Third, victims must receive formal acknowledgement and recognition of the grave injustices and losses they have suffered. Finally, to work effectively, transitional justice measures must be accompanied by programs that promote security and the rule of law, economic and educational opportunities, access to accurate and unbiased information, freedom of movement and speech, and other comprehensive measures.

It is our hope that this report will assist policymakers in developing a coherent and integrated transitional justice program for Northern Uganda that takes into account public expectations for both peace and justice.

Survey Sites and Procedures

Survey sites were selected based on exposure to the conflict, ethnicity and language (Acholi, Langi, and Ateso), and site accessibility (because of security concerns). In Gulu and Kitgum, where up to 95 percent of the population has been displaced, 25 percent of the IDP camps were systematically selected proportionate to the population size using demographic data collected by the World Food Programme.9 Because of the precarious security situation in these districts, a list of alternative camps was also sampled. On three occasions in Gulu, survey teams had to work in these alternative camps.

Within the camps, interviewers were randomly assigned to “zones” identified by camp leaders. (The zones are a commonly used division of the camps to facilitate logistical and administrative matters.) The interviewers were directed to the center of each zone, where they randomly selected a direction in which to walk, and then selected every other household within that area. In each selected household, one adult (at least 18 years or older) was selected for an interview by a random selection procedure. When a selected household or individual was unable to participate, the next available household, or another individual within the selected household, was selected.

In Lira and Soroti,10 where displacements were relatively less prevalent, teams conducted surveys in 25 percent of the IDP camps and 25 percent of the subcounties. Participants in the IDP camps were selected using the same methods as Gulu and Kitgum. Sampling within the subcounties comprised two parishes being randomly selected from a list; within each parish, two villages were chosen. At the village level, interviewers used the random geographic technique described above to select households as well as individuals within those households. To ensure representation of urban areas, the main municipality of each of the four selected districts was also sampled. Sampling procedure within the municipality was similar to that of the subcounties.

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9 See list of the selected camps in Annex 1.  
10 See list of the selected camps and subcounties in Annex 1.
The minimum target sample size for each district was 500. Sample size was determined using the difference in proportion formula and was adjusted for design effect due to stratification and cluster sampling. The assumed level of precision was 10 percent with 80 percent power. In the end, 2,585 individuals (approximately 650 samples per district) were sampled. Twenty-nine percent of the 3,613 households were empty or the household member refused to participate. Twelve percent of the 2,932 selected respondents were not available or refused to participate. Less than 1 percent of the collected interviews contained incomplete sections.

Once an individual was selected, the interviewer secured oral consent (because of the high illiteracy rate) using a standardized format. Three teams of 22 to 24 local interviewers trained to use the questionnaire conducted the interviews. One team conducted data collection in Gulu and Kitgum, while other two worked in Soroti and Lira. Each team reflected the ethnic composition of the district. The interviewers, who were between the ages of 20 and 32, were fluent in the local language. A list of local
volunteers was used to recruit interviewers in Gulu and Kitgum. The Institute of Public Health at Makerere University assisted in the recruitment and supervision of survey teams in Soroti and Lira. In addition, a senior researcher from Tulane University supervised the data collection in each site. The data collection teams included equal number of men and women. Due to the sensitivity of certain questions, male interviewers interviewed male respondents and female interviewers interviewed female respondents.

Survey Instrument

The survey instrument was designed to collect quantitative data on eight topics: (1) Socio-economic Information, (2) Priorities and Peace, (3) Human Rights and Accountability, (4) Amnesty, (5) Justice, (6) Reconciliation, (7) Security and Traumatic Experience, and (8) Psychological Response to Trauma. A team with expertise in human rights, law, transitional justice, epidemiology, psychiatry, anthropology, surveying, and the conflict in Northern Uganda developed and reviewed the survey instrument. The instrument was first developed in English and was then translated into Acholi, Langi, and Ateso by graduates of the Language Department at Makerere University and local translators. (To ensure quality, the instrument was back-translated.) Discrepancies were resolved through an extensive discussion between the translator, back-translator, and survey designer. Where agreement on a particular word or phrase could not be reached, a content expert was consulted. The Acholi version was used in Gulu and Kitgum, the Langi version was used in Lira, and the Ateso was used in Soroti.

Prior to the launch of the survey, the instrument was piloted among local experts, randomly selected individuals, and random sample of approximately 100 participants from a nonstudy site. Necessary revisions to the instruments and the study protocol were made after each pilot stage. The resulting structured questionnaire used an open-ended questions format. Response options were given to facilitate the interviewer’s recording of the responses. These options were not read to the respondents. Where the interviewers were not sure which responses to check, they were instructed to specify the responses in the “other, specify” categories. Where appropriate, these responses were checked and recoded during data analysis. In addition, participants were allowed to provide more than one response to several questions.

Statistical Analysis

Double data entry was implemented with EPI Info version 6.0 (a free data entry and analysis software developed by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention and World Health Organization), and cross-checked with the Validate duplicate entry function. It was then exported into Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 13.0 for data analysis. Means and proportional sampling error were calculated by SPSS complex sample analyses. Sampling was conducted proportionate to population size and hence no weighting was performed.
Limitations of the Study

While the study was conducted as rigorously as possible, some limitations need to be acknowledged because of the security and political climate at the time of data design and collection. First, the survey took place during a period of escalation and intensification of LRA attacks in the northern districts of Uganda. Security concerns prevented sample collection in the other Acholi district of Pader. It also limited the on-site time for data collection, as survey teams could travel to the IDP camps only between 10 A.M. and 4 P.M. Interviewers could not reach those who worked or otherwise ventured far outside of the camp during this time period, and it is unknown whether the opinion of this group differed from those who were sampled. Moreover, because of financial constraints and limitations on time and human resources, survey teams were unable to sample in all of the districts affected by the violence. As a result, this study may not be regionally or nationally representative. However, it is representative of each of the four districts that were surveyed.

Second, inaccurate recall may have affected the validity of responses to specific traumatic events, although this was probably mitigated by the fact that the conflict is ongoing and events are still fresh in many respondents’ minds.

In addition, a number of survey questions pertaining to perceptions of peace and justice were time-sensitive; victim perspectives on these issues are not static. Consequently, responses could differ in the event of a radical alteration of circumstances on the ground, such as the conclusion of a peace agreement and an end to the conflict. Policymakers should monitor attitudinal changes over time.

Third, in some cases, the responses may have reflected some level of social desirability and set pattern effect. For example, when directly asked to indicate support for a particular concept or process, respondents often responded affirmatively, whereas follow-up questions showed a greater ambiguity. The questionnaire was specifically designed to minimize this concern. In addition, the study was carried out in a difficult and tense political context, and it is possible the respondents might have associated the research with an official initiative. While this may have impacted the measurement of support levels (e.g., for the Ugandan government), this possibility was mitigated by diversity of opinion and respondents’ willingness to support choices other than the government. Respondents were further informed of our independent status through the informed consent form.

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11 Social desirability occurs when a respondent answers in a manner that he or she thinks will please the interviewer. Set pattern occurs when a respondent repeatedly provides the same answer (e.g., a series of “yes” responses), indicating that he or she may not be paying full attention to the question.
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Background

Uganda’s war has destroyed any semblance of ordinary life in the northern districts. The current conflict dates back to 1986, and the formation of the Holy Spirit Movement, or the Holy Spirit Mobile Forces, by Alice Lakwena, a spirit medium. By the end of 1986, it had recruited nearly 18,000 soldiers. Lakwena’s movement was rooted in mistrust fostered among the Acholi against President Museveni and the National Reform Movement. In October 1987, Lakwena left Acholiland with some 10,000 followers and led them south in a marauding crusade. They were finally defeated east of Jinja, some 80 miles from Kampala. Lakwena herself escaped on a bicycle and now lives in a refugee camp in Kenya. Simultaneous to the decline of the Holy Spirit Movement, Joseph Kony commenced to build the LRA, the spiritual rebel movement that is responsible for much of the violence today.

Kony is shrouded in mystery, and there is no clear consensus on his motivations. A former commander in the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) with little formal education, he initially claimed to have inherited the spirit of Lakwena (although some say that the spirit has left him in recent years). He is said to have apocalyptic visions, and to see himself as a messenger of God and a liberator of the Acholi people. He has invented his own belief system and set of rituals, drawing from a mix of Christianity, Islam, and animist beliefs. Kony has repeatedly called for Museveni’s demise and the overthrow of the Ugandan government, but it is unclear whether his is a true quest for political control.

Early on, Kony experienced jarring rejections from Acholi leaders. The first LRA operations were largely failures because popular support was considerably less than for the previous military uprising in the north and for Alice’s movement. As a result, Kony turned increasingly against the local population, accusing people of aiding the government in seeking his defeat. A notable example came in 1991, when the LRA attacked the towns of Kitgum and Gulu in retaliation for forming a government-sponsored civil defense force, the “Bow and Arrow” militia.

The LRA’s method of warfare has had a profound psychological impact on the local population. LRA rebels use extreme violence, especially against civilians, to instill fear and maintain control. The severity of attacks appears to come in waves, with major massacres interspersed across an ongoing campaign of low-intensity, small-scale assaults. The major massacres tend to come in retaliation to government initiatives (such as the

12 For some of the background to the conflict that predates this, see Annex 2.
13 The LRA was originally called the Holy Spirit Movement II, but was later renamed—first as the Lord’s Salvation Army, then as the United Christian Democratic Army, and finally to its present name in 1992.
14 For a more recent account of Kony and his motivations, see, e.g., “Uganda LRA rebel leader ‘speaks,’” BBC News, April 15, 2004.
15 Doom and Vlassenroot, supra note 13 at 23.
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launching of a new military campaign or successes achieved through the amnesty process).

LRA rebels mutilate, abduct children, and commit rape and other acts of sexual violence against women and girls. The LRA routinely cuts off lips, ears, and breasts; gouges eyes; and amputates limbs. Many of these mutilations are carried out to prevent “betrayals.” Killings of civilians are widespread. Men are forced to lie on their fronts, and their heads are smashed. Women are forced to lie on their backs, and their throats are cut.16 Many attacks are conducted at night, when the LRA raids villages or IDP camps for food and other supplies.

Many of the local population have ambivalent feelings toward the LRA, largely because its ranks comprise their own children. When the government announces that “20 rebels were killed,” many Acholi grieve, as they know these casualties could be their own offspring.17

Current estimates of the number of LRA members range between 1,000 and 3,000, with a core of 150 to 200 commanders, some of whom have military backgrounds. During 19 years of war, the LRA has abducted 20,000 or more children.18 The LRA reportedly favors 9- to 12-year-olds because that age group is the most malleable.19 Many adults are also abducted, but are usually released after a short period after helping to carry looted goods. Children represent approximately three out of every four abductions, and their captivity can last for years.

Once abducted, the children are conscripted as soldiers, porters, and sexual slaves. Child soldiers are often forced to commit atrocities as soon they are abducted in order to “make a clean break” and to make it more difficult for them to contemplate return. The porters are used mainly to carry stolen loot and have been characterized as “disposable.” These children are considered an asset to the LRA because they can walk quickly and do not tire easily. If they do slow down, or are unable to keep up, they are killed, or mutilated and then killed.20

Only about half as many girls are abducted as boys, but they are not spared the LRA’s brutality.21 The LRA reportedly favors preadolescent girls because they are believed to be free of sexually transmitted diseases.22 The LRA reportedly has a practice of not raping the younger girls so that they will be free of infection when, at the age of 14 or 15, they

17 Some have remarked that if Uganda Peoples’ Defence Force (Ugandan army, or UPDF) kill anyone, they refer to “rebels,” whereas if they capture LRA, these are always “rescued children.”
19 See “Behind the Violence,” supra note 16 at 23.
20 Id. at 20–21.
may be “married” to commanders. The younger girls are subjected to long hours of grueling domestic work (e.g., walking long distances to fetch water and firewood, cooking, and working in the fields). The movement works through a combination of extreme punishment for unwanted behavior and incentives for good behavior. More senior commanders are given power, resources, and wives.

The LRA remains a viable force for several reasons. First, until recently, the LRA received support from the Sudanese government, which gave it military equipment (particularly after 1994) and allowed it to set up camps across the border. Although the LRA no longer receives weapons, it reportedly has created arms stockpiles and regularly attacks military barracks to steal new weapons. Second, the LRA is adept at waging guerrilla warfare. Many senior LRA have military backgrounds and employ sophisticated military strategies. Since the government has started using helicopter gun-ships, LRA forces have tended to move in small groups of two or three, regrouping at agreed points. Communications are conducted by GSM phones and radios, and senior commanders often hide in the bush, sending rank-and-file to the front lines. Finally, the LRA reportedly receive some support from the local population and opponents to the current regime.

The Humanitarian Crisis

The LRA’s campaign of violence has resulted in the mass displacement of 1.6 million people, representing approximately 94 percent of the population in Gulu, 93 percent in Kitgum, 39 percent in Lira, and 24 percent in Soroti. These numbers are staggering, particularly in the Acholi district. Most IDPs have settled in camps where the high concentration of people has made the population more vulnerable and harder to protect from LRA incursions. The LRA frequently attack the camps, partly because Kony sees these individuals as loyal to the government. The Ugandan government has been criticized for assigning a relatively small number of troops to protect the camp population. The Uganda Peoples’ Defence Force (Ugandan army, UPDF) has also been involved in abusing camp residents.

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23 Id. at 28 and, more generally, at 28–31.
24 Some are concerned that this may indicate that the LRA is fragmenting and that there is a loss of command and control.
26 E.g., camp residents have been punished for “not leaving camps when asked to do so by the LRA, riding bicycles, listening to radios etc.” Id. at 50. While LRA violence seems to have prompted large-scale displacement in Uganda, the government has ordered the population to leave their villages and congregate in “protective” camps as part of the government’s military strategy in fighting the LRA. For contrasting views on the causes of displacement, see “Uganda: Interview with the minister for disaster preparedness and refugees,” UNOCHA-IRIN, June 2005, and “Nowhere to Hide,” supra note 25 at 66.
28 Human Rights Watch, “Concerns Regarding Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Uganda,” May 2005, at 9–11, provides detailed report of such allegations.
Life in the IDP camps has been very destructive to the Acholi. An agrarian and pastoral people, most Acholi now rely almost exclusively on food aid. Social disintegration in the camps is profound. There is little work for men, who often resort to self-destructive coping mechanisms, such as alcoholism. Suicide is common. The rate of HIV/AIDS is reportedly higher in the camps than elsewhere. Domestic violence and rape are widespread. Nearly 30 percent of the children who live in the camps are orphans. Basic schooling is available for those who can afford a small fee, but many cannot.

Every evening, scores of children living outside of the towns make a nightly trek into the centers of provincial towns. They sleep in doorways, on verandas, and in bus stations, hospitals, and schools. They are known as “night commuters,” and they make the trip from their rural homes because they are afraid of being abducted by the LRA.

Most of the land in the Acholi districts (Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader) lies arid and is overgrown with bush. Villages have been abandoned which, in turn, has facilitated the undisturbed movement of LRA rebels through the countryside. Many IDPs fear they will never be able to return to their land while Kony remains in the bush.

The Government’s Response

The Ugandan government maintains it is pursuing a three-pillared strategy to end the LRA conflict: “1) a military response, 2) peaceful negotiation and 3) prayer.” Since 1986, the government has launched six military offensives against the LRA. The first was Operation North, in 1991, which was the first coordinated attempt to eliminate the LRA. Operation North succeeded in weakening the LRA and, by 1992 and 1993, the intensity of the conflict was greatly reduced.

The government started formal peace talks with the remnants of the LRA in 1994. The government mediator was Betty Bigombe, then Minister for the North, and a resident of Gulu. Bigombe held secret talks with Kony and his army commander, Komakech Omona. A cease-fire and safe-conduct guarantees were secured and a peace agreement appeared imminent. However, the peace process eventually collapsed as suspicion grew on both sides. With support from Sudan, LRA violence rose drastically, marking a new stage in the conflict.

In the following years, there were alternating periods of violence and calm, with notable lulls in 1996 and 2000. By 2001, the conflict had abated to the point that plans were under way to prepare for the eventual resettlement of the camp populations to their

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29 The economy was about 90 percent agrarian and 10 percent pastoral.
30 In fact, one humanitarian agency stated that almost every woman in the camps had suffered sexual violence.
33 See Doom and Vlassenroot, supra note 13 at 24.
34 The LRA has reportedly used the calmer periods to regroup.
villages. Warming relations between the Sudanese and Ugandan governments also secured an agreement to allow the UPDF to pursue the LRA across the Sudanese border. The first large-scale military operation under this arrangement, Operation Iron Fist, was launched in 2002. Consistent with its past conduct, the LRA responded to Operation Iron Fist with a new campaign of violence against the civilian population, but this time, the LRA spread the conflict east into the non-Acholi districts of Lira and Soroti.

In March 2004, the Ugandan government launched its latest military offensive, Operation Iron Fist II, which included a renewal of the protocol with the Sudanese government. The LRA responded by unleashing a number of massive attacks, most severely on the Barlonya camp in Lira and the Pagak and Lukodi Camps in Gulu. In late 2004, the Ugandan government started a new peace process, again led by Betty Bigombe. It appeared to have initial success, and presented the most hopeful prospects for a peaceful settlement to the conflict since 1994. A cease-fire with the LRA was secured at the end of November 2004, and subsequently extended a number of times until February 2005. By June 2005, the prospects for peace in the north remained less certain, and low-level fighting between the LRA and UPDF continued, as did LRA attacks on civilians.

An Alternative Vision for Peace

In recent years, an alternative vision has emerged to end the conflict in Northern Uganda, mainly inspired by religious and traditional Acholi leaders. In particular, the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative has played a critical leadership role. The approach involves pursuing peace talks while simultaneously offering amnesty to LRA rebels and reintegrating them into their communities. To this end, an Amnesty Act was passed in 2000. In addition, Acholi traditional leaders have begun introducing traditional justice ceremonies as a means of assisting reintegration. To date, some 14,000 former combatants have applied for amnesty, including approximately 6,000 LRA.

This alternative approach to resolving the conflict, which aims at a negotiated settlement followed by widespread reintegration, is supported by many international humanitarian organizations active in Northern Uganda, as well as by victims’ groups and other human rights organizations. Increasingly, these groups have begun to focus on joint advocacy activities. One of the most active coalitions is the Civil Society Organizations for Peace in Northern Uganda (CSOPNU), which regularly issues public statements about the peace process and the conflict.

35 Respectively, upwards of 200, 39, and 41 deaths, in addition to other injuries and destruction of property.
36 In February 2005, Sam Kolo, who had been Bigombe’s chief contact in the negotiations, surrendered to the government.
37 For more information, see Annex 3.
38 For more information, see Annex 4.
The International Criminal Court

President Museveni referred the situation in Northern Uganda to the ICC at a joint press conference with Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo in London on January 29, 2004. The following month, the Prosecutor announced that he would include in his purview the crimes committed in Barlonya Camp, and in July 2004 the Court formally opened an investigation. The Prosecutor has recently said that investigations are nearing completion and that the Court is on the verge of issuing arrest warrants. He has also stated that prosecutors are focusing only on the LRA’s most senior leadership and that only a handful of individuals will be indicted.

The ICC’s intervention has sparked considerable controversy in Uganda. Critics of the Court’s intervention, including many Acholi religious and traditional leaders and representatives of international humanitarian organizations, question whether the Ugandan government should be allowed to limit the terms of the referral to crimes committed by the LRA. (In response, the ICC prosecutor clarified in a letter to the President of the Court that he was entitled to investigate and prosecute any crimes committed in the region.) Some have also faulted the Prosecutor for announcing the referral in the company of President Museveni and doubt whether he will investigate the UPDF with the same rigor as the LRA.

More significantly, critics feel that peace must come before justice. They argue that investigations and eventual indictments will effectively kill the peace process and prevent LRA rebels from availing themselves of the amnesty. They argue that the Acholi people should be allowed to respond to the legacy of past atrocities in their own way and employ means that resonate and accord with local traditions. Betty Bigombe has announced that she will resign if the ICC proceeds with arrest warrants against the top LRA leaders.

Conversely, supporters of the ICC intervention have argued that it has contributed to a renewed focus on the conflict in Northern Uganda. They believe that this increased attention helped prompt Sudan to stop supporting the LRA, and that the opening of investigations may have prompted the LRA to partake in peace negotiations in late 2004. Supporters argue that many factors beyond the Court have contributed to a continuation of the violence, and that a permanent peace will have to be accompanied by accountability.

The ICC has responded to these tensions by engaging in a dialogue with traditional and religious leaders from Northern Uganda. Several delegations have visited the ICC in The

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39 President Museveni has further exacerbated the situation by making public statements that appear to contradict his support of the ICC. In August 2004, just as the peace process was gaining momentum, he indicated that he would allow Kony and other LRA commanders to participate in the amnesty program (even though the ICC has clearly indicated that it does not consider itself bound by the Amnesty Act). Then, in November 2004, when prospects for peace were looking hopeful, Museveni announced that he would seek to withdraw the referral to the ICC and find other ways to deal with the LRA.

40 The ICC has refrained from implementing a comprehensive outreach program in Northern Uganda because it believes the sensitivity of the investigations merits a “low profile” strategy.
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Hague, including a delegation of Acholi leaders in March 2005 and one of Acholi, Lango, Iteso, and Madi leaders in April 2005. During these exchanges, the Prosecutor has stated that he is mindful of the peace process and retains the ability to defer investigations “in the interests of justice,” but that he cannot close investigations altogether.

The Prosecutor and leaders noted in April 2005 that they had “agreed to work together as part of a common effort to achieve justice and an end of violence in northern Uganda.” However, this statement of intent continues to be shrouded in ambiguity, and significant uncertainty remains about the course that the ICC will decide to take.

Survey Results

Demographics of the Respondents

A total of 2,585 interviews were conducted during the data-collection process. Table 1 summarizes some socio-demographic information. By design, the survey was administered to the same ratio of female-to-male respondents. The mean and median ages were relatively high, at 37 and 34, which may be skewed by the presence of a few elderly people in the sample. Approximately 95 percent of our respondents were between the ages of 23 and 45. The majority (73 percent) described themselves as being in a partner relationship, such as civil marriage (marriage by court), traditional marriage (conducted by traditional ceremony and exchange of dowries), and religious marriage (marriage performed by priest). If, for financial or logistical reasons (e.g., displacement), people cannot conclude one of these types of marriages, they will enter into a long-term and informal “partnership.”

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41 Under Art. 53 of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor is given discretion to decide that proceeding with investigations or prosecutions is not in the interests of justice. If he decides to discontinue an investigation, the Pre-Trial Chamber will review this decision. Although the Statute does not specify what is meant by “the interests of justice,” it may be presumed that qualifying circumstances would be quite narrow, but might include a significant risk of increase in violence.
Table 1: Respondent Background Information, Northern Uganda, April–May 2005*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts (n = 2,585)</th>
<th>Gulu</th>
<th>Kitgum</th>
<th>Lira</th>
<th>Soroti</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample Size</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>315  (50%)</td>
<td>321 (50%)</td>
<td>326 (50%)</td>
<td>325 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>313  (50%)</td>
<td>328 (50%)</td>
<td>332 (50%)</td>
<td>325 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Age (sd. dev.)</td>
<td>36.19 (1)</td>
<td>37.5 (14)</td>
<td>37.5 (15)</td>
<td>35.3 (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Age</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Ethnicity</td>
<td>Acholi 601 (97%)</td>
<td>Acholi 642 (99%)</td>
<td>Langi 633 (96%)</td>
<td>Iteso 603 (93%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ever Been Displaced (Yes)</td>
<td>541 (89%)</td>
<td>574 (90%)</td>
<td>479 (73%)</td>
<td>405 (63%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Average Sampling Error is +/-3 Percentage Points.

One-quarter of the respondents (25 percent) had never received any education. Another 40 percent had some primary school education but had not completed it. Less than 6 percent had schooling beyond secondary school. According to the Uganda National Household Survey of 2002–03, only 47 percent of the population of Northern Uganda is literate, compared to more than 62 percent in the rest of the country (77 percent in the Central region).

Fifty-eight percent of respondents considered themselves to be Roman Catholic, and 31 percent to be part of the Anglican Church. Another 8 percent identified themselves as “Savedees” (Born Again Christians). There was a greater percentage of Savedees in Soroti than in the other three districts. By our sampling design, approximately half the respondents (49 percent) were Acholi (mainly from Gulu and Kitgum), one-quarter (24 percent) Langi (from Lira), and one-quarter (24 percent) Iteso (from Soroti). A small proportion (3 percent) said they belonged to another ethnic group or were of mixed ethnicity. Finally, as many as 4 out of 5 respondents interviewed (79 percent) had been displaced in the 19 years of ongoing conflict. This indicates the widespread impact of the conflict on the livelihood of these communities.

Exposure to Violence

The analysis of the data indicates that 20 years of war and political unrest in Northern Uganda has traumatically affected virtually the entire population. Four out of five respondents had been exposed to at least one or more of the listed events of direct traumatic exposure. Forty percent indicated they had been formally abducted, 31 percent had a child that was abducted, and 58 percent witnessed a child being abducted. Almost half (45 percent) of the respondents had witnessed a member of their family killed, and almost the same amount (48 percent) witnessed a friend or neighbor killed, and/or was threatened with death (49 percent). About one-third of the respondents were forced to carry loads for the LRA (33 percent). Almost one-quarter (23 percent) of the respondents had been physically mutilated, maimed, or injured by the LRA. Similarly, 24 percent had...
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been physically beaten or injured by a family member and/or witnessed someone who was sexually violated (25 percent). About 7 percent admitted they had experienced a sexual violation.

Estimates of exposure to the 11 listed major violent events are among the highest formally reported.43

Table 2: Exposure to Traumatic Events in Northern Uganda, May 2005*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Gulu (n = 628)</th>
<th>Kitgum (n = 649)</th>
<th>Lira (n = 649)</th>
<th>Soroti (n = 649)</th>
<th>Total (n = 2,585)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Was abducted</td>
<td>327 (53%)</td>
<td>347 (54%)</td>
<td>195 (30%)</td>
<td>149 (23%)</td>
<td>1,018 (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Had a child that was abducted</td>
<td>223 (36%)</td>
<td>258 (40%)</td>
<td>195 (30%)</td>
<td>123 (19%)</td>
<td>799 (31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Witnessed a child that was abducted</td>
<td>429 (69%)</td>
<td>417 (65%)</td>
<td>352 (54%)</td>
<td>300 (46%)</td>
<td>1,498 (58%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Witnessed a family member killed</td>
<td>292 (47%)</td>
<td>298 (47%)</td>
<td>349 (53%)</td>
<td>205 (32%)</td>
<td>1,144 (45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Witnessed a friend or neighbor killed</td>
<td>245 (39%)</td>
<td>279 (44%)</td>
<td>406 (62%)</td>
<td>299 (46%)</td>
<td>1,229 (48%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Was threatened of death</td>
<td>370 (60%)</td>
<td>347 (54%)</td>
<td>243 (37%)</td>
<td>299 (47%)</td>
<td>1,259 (49%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Was physically mutilated, maimed, or injured by the LRA</td>
<td>122 (20%)</td>
<td>116 (18%)</td>
<td>203 (31%)</td>
<td>144 (22%)</td>
<td>585 (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Was forced to carry loads for the LRA</td>
<td>301 (48%)</td>
<td>262 (41%)</td>
<td>145 (22%)</td>
<td>126 (20%)</td>
<td>834 (33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Was sexually violated</td>
<td>64 (10%)</td>
<td>46 (7%)</td>
<td>42 (6%)</td>
<td>34 (5%)</td>
<td>186 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Witnessed someone being sexually violated</td>
<td>182 (29%)</td>
<td>117 (18%)</td>
<td>167 (26%)</td>
<td>173 (27%)</td>
<td>639 (25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Have been physically beaten or injured by a family member</td>
<td>138 (22%)</td>
<td>117 (18%)</td>
<td>183 (28%)</td>
<td>177 (27%)</td>
<td>615 (24%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Average Sampling Error is +/-3 Percentage Points.

43 Some figures, such as sexual violence, may actually be higher than reported here. P.N. Pham, H.M. Weinstein, and T. Longman, “Trauma and PTSD: Their Implication for Attitudes Towards Justice and Reconciliation,” *Journal of the American Medical Association* 292:5, 2004, 602–612.

Human Rights, Peace, and Justice

To set the stage for the discussion of the key objectives of this survey, interviewers needed to know how respondents understood a variety of key concepts relating to transitional justice. Respondents were asked to define key terminologies such as human rights, peace, justice, and reconciliation. By understanding how each respondent defined these key concepts, we hoped to have a greater insight into their responses to the associated questions. The respondents were free to provide multiple responses for each concept.

When asked, “What are human rights?” about 29 percent said that human rights entailed a “life with peace and security and without fear.” More than one-third of the respondents indicated freedom of speech. (When asked about which violations are common to Northern Uganda, about 10 percent of respondents referred to the lack of freedom of speech. A perception of lack of democratic mechanisms of participation and a platform for voicing opinions freely may account for this response.)

In defining human rights, 21 percent of the respondents mentioned dignity, 18 percent noted socioeconomic rights, 16 percent cited justice, and 12 percent mentioned freedom of movement. Other proposed definitions included the right to an education (9 percent), independence (4 percent), and the right to live (2 percent). Comparison between the districts indicated a slightly different understanding between the Acholi districts (Gulu and Kitgum) and the non-Acholi districts (Lira and Soroti). Respondents from the Acholi districts were more concerned about livelihood issues, such as socioeconomic rights, dignity, and the right to life, than the respondents from non-Acholi districts. Respondents from non-Acholi districts were more focused on issues of justice, peace, and security. These differences may reflect the length of time during which Acholi districts, as
opposed to the non-Acholi districts, have been affected by the violence, and the levels of displacement in those districts.

A majority of respondents (59 percent) defined “peace” as an “absence of violence, war, and/or conflict.” The next most frequent response came from the recoding of the open-ended “other” category. A large percentage of the respondents proposed “life with freedom, basic needs, and happiness” (18 percent). About 17 percent described peace as returning to their villages, an indication of the likely high priority on that issue. Fourteen percent described it as a broader development issue. Five percent described peace as either reconciliation or education for children. Four percent equated peace with justice.

More than half of the 2,571 respondents (56 percent) were optimistic that peace could be obtained in Northern Uganda. Respondents from Kitgum, where the security situation is more tenuous, were less optimistic than those interviewed in Gulu (48 percent versus 67 percent, respectively). In Lira and Soroti, more than one-half of the respondents (53 percent and 57 percent, respectively) thought it was possible to achieve peace in Northern Uganda. Those who were more exposed to traumatic events were less likely to be optimistic ($\chi^2 = 10.08$, df = 3, p-value = .02). Optimism about the prospects for peace was also associated with age and sex. Males were more optimistic than females ($\chi^2 = 68.66$, df = 3, p-value<.001), and young people were more optimistic than the elderly (p-value<.001). When asked how peace could be achieved, the responses were more divided. Almost 30 percent believe peace could be achieved through dialogue and discussion; 26 percent through amnesty, forgiveness, and reconciliation; 14 percent through military options; and 5 percent through justice.

Respondents defined “justice” in diverse ways (see Table 3). Thirty-one percent defined justice as trials. That response, however, was notably less frequent in Soroti (about 15 percent) than in the other three districts (more than 30 percent). Inversely, in Soroti, a non-Acholi district, more than one-third (35 percent) stated that justice was reconciliation. This contrast with the two Acholi districts, Gulu and Kitgum, where only 12 percent and 3 percent, respectively, stated that justice was reconciliation. Another common response was that justice consisted of “truth and fairness” (11 percent overall). This was relatively high in Kitgum (22 percent). Relatively few respondents described justice in terms of social justice. About 10 percent mentioned assistance to victims, 8 percent compensation, 3 percent rebuilding of infrastructure, and 2 percent education for children. Nineteen percent said they did not know what justice meant.
Finally, a little more than half of the respondents associate the concept of “reconciliation” with “forgiveness” (52 percent). Respondents from the non-Acholi district were more likely to associate reconciliation with forgiveness than those from the Acholi districts (62 percent versus 43 percent, respectively).

Out of all respondents, 24 percent believed reconciliation entailed confession, while 23 percent said reconciliation consisted of “togetherness, unity, and peace.” Only 9 percent associated reconciliation with a traditional ceremony. In general, fewer respondents defined reconciliation as justice (6 percent) than defined justice as reconciliation (18 percent). More respondents in Soroti associated reconciliation with justice when compared to other districts. About 11 percent mentioned other definitions for reconciliation, and 19 percent did not know how to define it.

In short, it appears that there is a higher level of common understanding among respondents on concepts of peace and reconciliation than there is on justice and on human rights.

**Justice and Accountability**

**Immediate Needs and Concerns**

To avoid leading the respondents and to establish a rapport, the interviewers approached the subject of justice with a set of general questions related to their immediate needs and concerns. This enabled interviewers to progress to portions of the survey that required a deeper reflection on their perceptions.
Respondents were asked to identify their immediate concerns and, if they listed more than one, to rank them. Only their first choices are reflected here. Food and peace were the top two main concerns mentioned (34 percent and 31 percent, respectively). Ten percent stated concerns not listed in the table. Health and education for children were also mentioned, albeit less frequently. Less than 1 percent mentioned justice as their most immediate concern (although this does not reflect the overall importance attached to it).

Respondents were asked to specify what they believed should be prioritized once peace was achieved. A majority (63 percent) wanted IDPs to return to their villages. This high percentage suggests that those surveyed have a strong desire to return to their normal way of life. Respondents also gave priority to rebuilding village infrastructure (29 percent), providing compensations to victims (22 percent), providing education to children (21 percent), and restoring livelihoods (11 percent). Another 8 percent mentioned holding elections, eliminating the LRA, and teaching others the consequences of violence. One percent said they did not know what should be done first.

**Accountability**

Three questions were designed to probe respondents’ attitudes toward accountability: “Is it important to you that persons responsible for abuses in Northern Uganda are held accountable for their actions? If, yes, should anyone be held accountable for the abuses you listed? And, if yes, who should be held accountable?” So as not to presume what
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respondents meant by accountability, they were also asked what they would like to see happen to those who committed abuses.

Overall, the majority of respondents (76 percent) said that those responsible for abuses should be held accountable for their actions. Except for Kitgum district, males were significantly more likely than females to want accountability ($\chi^2 = 37.8, df = 2, p-value = .001$). Those who were exposed to at least one of the 11 traumatic events listed in Table 2 were more likely to believe accountability is important than those who were not exposed to any of the listed traumatic events ($\chi^2 = 10.6, df = 2, p-value = .005$).

Respondents from the non-Acholi districts were three times more likely to believe someone should be held accountable than the Acholi districts (Odds Ratio = 3.37, 95 percent CI = 2.71, 4.20). When the interviewers probed further to identify those who should be held accountable, approximately 37 percent of 1468 respondents said Kony and other LRA leaders, 29 percent the LRA in general, 16 percent President Museveni and the Ugandan government, 7 percent the government security apparatus (i.e., military, police, and local militias), and 11 percent all those who committed abuses.

To understand further what the respondents meant by accountability, interviewers asked specific questions about what they would like to see happen to the actors mentioned above (see Table 4).

Table 4: What would you like to see happen to those LRA leaders who are responsible for violations?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Gulu (n = 618)</th>
<th>Kitgum (n = 638)</th>
<th>Lira (n = 652)</th>
<th>Soroti (n = 642)</th>
<th>Total (n = 2,550)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forgive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(reconcile and reintegration)</td>
<td>229 (37%)</td>
<td>160 (25%)</td>
<td>50 (8%)</td>
<td>114 (18%)</td>
<td>553 (22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confront and confess to community</td>
<td>21 (3%)</td>
<td>19 (3%)</td>
<td>6 (1%)</td>
<td>13 (2%)</td>
<td>59 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensate victims</td>
<td>3 (1%)</td>
<td>8 (1%)</td>
<td>2 (0.3%)</td>
<td>13 (2%)</td>
<td>26 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punishment (trial and imprison or kill)</td>
<td>271 (44%)</td>
<td>392 (61%)</td>
<td>575 (88%)</td>
<td>439 (68%)</td>
<td>1,677 (66%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>94 (15%)</td>
<td>59 (9%)</td>
<td>19 (3%)</td>
<td>63 (10%)</td>
<td>235 (9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Average Sampling Error is +/-3 Percentage Points.

While 37 percent of respondents said LRA leaders should be held accountable for their crimes, more than half (58 percent) do not want lower-rank members to be held accountable.44 In Gulu, this number was as high as 72 percent, and in Lira, 62 percent. Conversely, in Soroti and Kitgum, many were also in favor of holding lower-ranking LRA members accountable (61 percent and 41 percent, respectively).

When asked what should happen to UPDF who have committed abuses, about 51 percent of respondents stated that they want to place them on trial; one-third (33 percent) wanted them to be punished in some form (e.g., imprisonment, dismissed from the military, dismissed from the military, dismissed from the military).

44 This seems logical, considering that many respondents’ children were abducted during the conflict.
demoted, counseled, etc.); 18 percent stated that they wanted them to be amnestied; and 8 percent did not know or stated “other.” Comparing between districts, respondents in Lira differed greatly from their counterparts in other districts. The desire for trials (64 percent) predominated in Lira compared to the other three districts sampled. The differences in responses regarding the LRA may be partly explained by the fact that in the past, some violations by the military have been punished.

Respondents were asked who should be in charge of holding accountable those responsible for abuses. Support for the government and the international community was relatively high, with 56 percent stating the government, 25 percent the international community, and 16 percent the local community. To gain a greater insight into this question, respondents were asked who they had heard expressing views about accountability. Thirty-six percent said the government and 23 percent stated the media. Eight percent pointed to the international community. (These answers correlate the responses on who should be in charge of holding people accountable.)

Consistent with these responses on accountability, 41 percent of the respondents also said that the government best represented their views on accountability. Fourteen percent stated that NGOs best represented their views. Overall, 12 percent stated that religious leaders were the best party for representing their views, and 6 percent identified the traditional leaders as most effective. The overall rate of respondents who stated that religious leaders are best at representing their point of view was 60 percent higher in the Acholi districts than the non-Acholi districts (OR = 1.60, 95% CI = 1.25, 2.05). Although overall 6 percent of the total respondents stated that the traditional leaders are the best at representing their view, 15 percent of the 620 respondents in Gulu said that they best represented their views. When asked who best represents the view of the victims, similar figures were obtained.

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45 Respondents were not asked to specify whether they included local authorities in their definition of “government,” or if they referred only to the government in Kampala.

46 These numbers should not necessarily be seen as reflecting support for any particular actors, but may instead reflect who respondents see as the critical actors in a particular arena.
Table 5: Who, if anyone, best represents your views?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Gulu (n = 620)</th>
<th>Kitgum (n = 639)</th>
<th>Lira (n = 656)</th>
<th>Soroti (n = 641)</th>
<th>Total (n = 2,556)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional leaders</td>
<td>92 (15%)</td>
<td>44 (7%)</td>
<td>16 (2%)</td>
<td>7 (1%)</td>
<td>159 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
<td>100 (16%)</td>
<td>86 (14%)</td>
<td>60 (9%)</td>
<td>66 (10%)</td>
<td>312 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>209 (34%)</td>
<td>244 (38%)</td>
<td>308 (47%)</td>
<td>292 (46%)</td>
<td>1,053 (41%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International community</td>
<td>35 (6%)</td>
<td>39 (6%)</td>
<td>139 (21%)</td>
<td>17 (3%)</td>
<td>230 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amnesty Commission</td>
<td>23 (4%)</td>
<td>16 (3%)</td>
<td>51 (8%)</td>
<td>3 (1%)</td>
<td>93 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
<td>13 (2%)</td>
<td>6 (10%)</td>
<td>120 (18%)</td>
<td>16 (3%)</td>
<td>155 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>95 (15%)</td>
<td>68 (11%)</td>
<td>115 (18%)</td>
<td>81 (13%)</td>
<td>359 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>49 (8%)</td>
<td>36 (6%)</td>
<td>15 (2%)</td>
<td>13 (2%)</td>
<td>113 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp leaders</td>
<td>85 (14%)</td>
<td>107 (17%)</td>
<td>51 (8%)</td>
<td>4 (1%)</td>
<td>247 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No one</td>
<td>20 (3%)</td>
<td>16 (3%)</td>
<td>15 (2%)</td>
<td>141 (22%)</td>
<td>192 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>83 (13%)</td>
<td>85 (13%)</td>
<td>26 (4%)</td>
<td>65 (10%)</td>
<td>259 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>33 (5%)</td>
<td>32 (5%)</td>
<td>14 (2%)</td>
<td>25 (4%)</td>
<td>104 (4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Respondent could provide more than one response. Percentages and totals are based on number of respondents. Average Sampling Error is +/-3 Percentage Points.

Amnesty and Reintegration

In light of the fact that Uganda has an established amnesty process, respondents were asked a series of questions about their knowledge of amnesty, and three out of five (64 percent) said they had knowledge of what it meant. Figures in Gulu, Kitgum, and Lira are higher than in Soroti. Knowledge about amnesty corresponded directly with knowledge of the Amnesty Commission (65 percent). The highest support for amnesty was found in Soroti, rather than the three other locations, where more awareness was acknowledged. In Soroti, 80 percent responded affirmatively when asked whether those who committed human right violations should receive amnesty. Sixty-nine percent of respondents in Gulu, 57 percent in Kitgum, and 53 percent in Lira supported amnesty for past offenders. There was no statistically significant link between knowledge of amnesty and desire for it. Respondents who had been exposed to at least one of the 11 assessed traumatic events (37 percent) were more likely to support amnesty than those who were not (Odds Ratio = 1.37, 95% CI = 1.10, 1.72).

Among those who opposed amnesty, 47 percent said Kony and his top commanders should not receive amnesty. More than one-third (36 percent) mentioned Kony only, and 18 percent cited all of the LRA. Eight percent of the respondents said that anyone who is guilty of crimes should not be amnestied.

47 Respondents were not asked how they understood the concept of amnesty, but it may be that many associated the concept with the work of the Amnesty Commission, which issues certificates to former combatants to assist their reintegration.
Respondents were also asked, “If the only road to peace was amnesty, would you accept that?” The overall support for amnesty increased slightly to 71 percent from 65 percent, but a relatively high number (29 percent) still said no. However, if one looks at the pattern of responses across the four districts, all of the percentages increased, except in Soroti. Respondents were asked, “If the LRA leaders or the lower-ranking LRA rebels were to be amnestied and returned to their communities, would you accept them back into the community?” Sixty-five percent said yes for the LRA leaders, compared to 79 percent for the lower-ranking LRA members. The differences between the two responses were statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 947.80$, df = 1, p-value = .001). Table 6 provides responses to the question, “What would you require those who are amnestied to do before you accept them back into your community?”

Table 6: What would you require those who are amnestied to do before you accept them back into your community?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Gulu (n = 622)</th>
<th>Kitgum (n = 637)</th>
<th>Lira (n = 656)</th>
<th>Soroti (n = 644)</th>
<th>Total (n = 2,559)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confess their wrongdoing</td>
<td>241 (39%)</td>
<td>268 (42%)</td>
<td>258 (39%)</td>
<td>114 (18%)</td>
<td>881 (34%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apologize</td>
<td>340 (55%)</td>
<td>346 (54%)</td>
<td>407 (62%)</td>
<td>340 (53%)</td>
<td>1,433 (56%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undergo traditional ceremony</td>
<td>99 (16%)</td>
<td>61 (10%)</td>
<td>30 (5%)</td>
<td>12 (2%)</td>
<td>202 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give compensation to the victims</td>
<td>25 (4%)</td>
<td>36 (6%)</td>
<td>42 (6%)</td>
<td>83 (13%)</td>
<td>186 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject themselves to trial</td>
<td>24 (4%)</td>
<td>47 (7%)</td>
<td>110 (17%)</td>
<td>138 (21%)</td>
<td>319 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing needs to be done</td>
<td>17 (3%)</td>
<td>18 (3%)</td>
<td>41 (6%)</td>
<td>17 (3%)</td>
<td>93 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in behavior</td>
<td>42 (7%)</td>
<td>30 (5%)</td>
<td>39 (6%)</td>
<td>22 (3%)</td>
<td>133 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confront community/ask for forgiveness</td>
<td>3 (1%)</td>
<td>1 (0.2%)</td>
<td>2 (0.3%)</td>
<td>9 (1%)</td>
<td>15 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punished (exiled, jailed, or put in army)</td>
<td>11 (2%)</td>
<td>13 (2%)</td>
<td>12 (2%)</td>
<td>28 (4%)</td>
<td>64 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>24 (4%)</td>
<td>15 (2%)</td>
<td>16 (2%)</td>
<td>33 (5%)</td>
<td>88 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>14 (2%)</td>
<td>17 (3%)</td>
<td>9 (1%)</td>
<td>16 (3%)</td>
<td>56 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know</td>
<td>33 (5%)</td>
<td>19 (3%)</td>
<td>14 (2%)</td>
<td>31 (5%)</td>
<td>97 (4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Respondents could provide more than one response. Percentages and totals are based on number of respondents. Average Sampling Error is +/-3 Percentage Points.

Traditional and Formal Justice Systems

Next, respondents were asked a series of questions that explored their attitudes toward formal and informal justice systems. These included: Should those who have committed abuses be tried through a judicial system? If so, whom? What kind of judicial system do you believe is the most appropriate to deal with the violations of human rights that have

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48 The current amnesty process does not require much beyond a renunciation of the armed rebellion. For more information, see Annex 3.
happened in Northern Uganda? Who do you believe can bring justice to Northern Uganda?

When asked whether those who had committed abuses should be tried through a judicial system, a significant number of respondents said yes: 67 percent and 76 percent for Gulu and Kitgum, respectively, and 90 percent and 86 percent for Lira and Soroti, respectively. There was little variance among these respondents based on gender, age, and exposure to traumatic events; the only statistical significant variable was ethnicity. Respondents from the Acholi districts were three times less likely to want trials than those from the non-Acholi districts (Odds Ratio = 3.0, 95% C.I. = 2.5, 3.8).49

Among those who wanted trials, the majority (66 percent) stated the LRA leaders should be tried, 37 percent chose the LRA, 16 percent pointed to the government, and 8 percent noted the government security apparatus. In Soroti and Lira, the Karamojong, a tribe from Eastern Uganda, were also mentioned (17 percent and 14 percent, respectively). The responses roughly corresponded to the previous questions about who should be held accountable, with one exception: the respondents indicated a greater desire to subject both the LRA and its leaders to trials.50

Of those who opposed trials (20 percent of the total respondents), the majority (59 percent) wanted “to forgive,” 23 percent “to reconcile,” and 14 percent wanted to place emphasis on “reintegration into the community.” Five percent said that LRA should participate in traditional forgiveness ceremonies, and 10 percent stated “other.” The remainder of the respondents (13 percent) stated “nothing,” “don’t know,” or “have no response.”

In general, respondents supported the national court system. However, only one-quarter of the respondents (25 percent) said that they were familiar with it, while 70 percent stated that they were not, and 5 percent were uncertain or did not want to respond. Despite their lack of familiarity with the national judicial system, 61 percent believe that the people can get a fair trial in Ugandan courts, whereas 21 percent said that people cannot. The remainder were either uncertain or did not have a response. Overall, considering the low levels of familiarity with the national court system, it is likely that many respondents were unaware of what constitutes a fair trial.

Overall, more than one-third (36 percent) believed the national court system was the most appropriate to deal with the abuses in Northern Uganda.51 Almost one-quarter (23 percent) named the ICC, and 16 percent mentioned the Amnesty Commission. In Kitgum, the support for the national court system (43 percent) was much greater than the three

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49 This information may seem to contradict earlier expressions of support for amnesty. There are many possible explanations. One is the social desirability factor described above, where people often answered yes when asked whether they supported a particular concept. Another possible explanation is if amnesty is not necessarily construed legally; i.e., as an absence of criminal liability.

50 A possible explanation for this increase in support may be that this was asked later in the survey. Another explanation may be social desirability.

51 This is not entirely self-explanatory, considering the limited reach of the formal court system. For more information, see Annex 5.
other districts. In Lira, the respondents were more supportive of the ICC (56 percent) than the other three districts. However, the overall awareness about the ICC was relatively low (27 percent). A relatively large percentage (19 percent) of respondents did not know which judicial system would be the most appropriate. As to where the respondents would like trials to be held, 42 percent preferred Uganda, 35 percent mentioned abroad, and 16 percent chose the northern region of Uganda.

When asked who they thought could “bring justice in Northern Uganda,” respondents said that the government (40 percent) and the international community (27 percent) were best suited for the task. Thirteen percent said that religious leaders could bring justice in Northern Uganda and 6 percent said that traditional leaders could. Thirteen percent said that God was a source for justice. Eight percent stated that all those involved in the peace process would facilitate justice in the region. Among the 5 percent who stated “others,” some specifically named President Museveni or chief peace mediator Betty Bigombe.

### Table 7: Who do you think can bring justice in Northern Uganda?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Gulu (n = 620)</th>
<th>Kitgum (n = 639)</th>
<th>Lira (n = 658)</th>
<th>Soroti (n = 645)</th>
<th>Total (n = 2,562)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional leaders</td>
<td>55 (9%)</td>
<td>55 (9%)</td>
<td>29 (4%)</td>
<td>4 (1%)</td>
<td>143 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
<td>83 (13%)</td>
<td>54 (9%)</td>
<td>117 (18%)</td>
<td>68 (11%)</td>
<td>322 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp or community leaders</td>
<td>12 (2%)</td>
<td>20 (3%)</td>
<td>7 (1%)</td>
<td>2 (0.3%)</td>
<td>41 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda government</td>
<td>212 (34%)</td>
<td>249 (39%)</td>
<td>210 (32%)</td>
<td>355 (55%)</td>
<td>1,026 (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those involved in the peace process</td>
<td>41 (7%)</td>
<td>40 (6%)</td>
<td>75 (11%)</td>
<td>44 (7%)</td>
<td>200 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The international community</td>
<td>133 (22%)</td>
<td>133 (21%)</td>
<td>332 (51%)</td>
<td>81 (13%)</td>
<td>679 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The community</td>
<td>21 (3%)</td>
<td>27 (4%)</td>
<td>30 (5%)</td>
<td>42 (7%)</td>
<td>120 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No one</td>
<td>12 (2%)</td>
<td>8 (1%)</td>
<td>1 (0.2%)</td>
<td>17 (3%)</td>
<td>38 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>God</td>
<td>32 (5%)</td>
<td>52 (8%)</td>
<td>101 (15%)</td>
<td>158 (25%)</td>
<td>343 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>52 (8%)</td>
<td>29 (5%)</td>
<td>16 (2%)</td>
<td>31 (5%)</td>
<td>128 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>82 (13%)</td>
<td>55 (8%)</td>
<td>47 (7%)</td>
<td>40 (6%)</td>
<td>224 (9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Respondent could provide more than one response. Percentages and totals are based on number of respondents. Average Sampling Error is +/-3 Percentage Points.

Overall, 36 percent know about the traditional justice system or traditional ceremonies, but this number was markedly higher among Acholi in the districts of Gulu (53 percent) and Kitgum (57 percent). Respondents from the two Acholi districts were more than five times more likely than those from the non-Acholi districts to know about the traditional justice system or traditional ceremonies (OR = 5.42, 95% C.I. = 4.52, 6.51). Of those who had knowledge of these system and ceremonies, a little more than one-half (56

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52 This higher level of knowledge about the ICC in Lira may be due to the fact that the Chief Prosecutor announced in February 2004 that he would specifically encompass the massacre in the Barlonya camp in his investigations.

53 Again, this may be more a question of what people think is feasible than who they actually support.
percent) had participated in such ceremonies and 48 percent said these ceremonies would be useful in dealing with the LRA. Table 8 highlights the reasons that respondents thought traditional justice may or may not be an appropriate mechanism to deal with the LRA.

**Table 8: Why or why not would traditional ceremonies be useful to deal with the LRA?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Gulu (n = 322)</th>
<th>Kitgum (n = 355)</th>
<th>Lira (n = 111)</th>
<th>Soroti (n = 111)</th>
<th>Total (n = 899)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To assist reconciliation</td>
<td>129 (40%)</td>
<td>101 (29%)</td>
<td>33 (30%)</td>
<td>19 (17%)</td>
<td>282 (32%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To prevent things from happening again</td>
<td>50 (15%)</td>
<td>30 (9%)</td>
<td>39 (35%)</td>
<td>4 (4%)</td>
<td>123 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To help the community</td>
<td>37 (11%)</td>
<td>27 (8%)</td>
<td>24 (22%)</td>
<td>23 (21%)</td>
<td>111 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To help the victims</td>
<td>32 (10%)</td>
<td>31 (9%)</td>
<td>16 (14%)</td>
<td>5 (5%)</td>
<td>84 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They are part of traditions</td>
<td>7 (2%)</td>
<td>9 (3%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>16 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They are not for such crimes</td>
<td>36 (11%)</td>
<td>72 (20%)</td>
<td>27 (24%)</td>
<td>26 (24%)</td>
<td>161 (18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They do not work</td>
<td>34 (11%)</td>
<td>51 (14%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>12 (11%)</td>
<td>98 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is no one qualified to apply them</td>
<td>24 (7%)</td>
<td>34 (10%)</td>
<td>8 (7%)</td>
<td>9 (8%)</td>
<td>75 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>31 (10%)</td>
<td>26 (7%)</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
<td>26 (23%)</td>
<td>85 (10%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Responses among respondents who have knowledge of traditional ceremonies. Respondent could provide more than one response. Percentages and totals are based on number of respondents. Average Sampling Error is +/-3 Percentage Points.

**The International Community and the ICC**

Four out of five respondents (84 percent) said that the international community should be involved in holding accountable those responsible for human rights violations. Among those, one-third (33 percent) said that members of the international community should serve as technical advisors, monitors (18 percent), and donors (18 percent).

Thirty-two percent said the international community should be the main responsible party for facilitating justice in Northern Uganda, but only 27 percent had heard of the ICC. Of these, most had learned about the Court through the media (63 percent), government (16 percent), friends and family (14 percent), traditional leaders (4 percent), religious leaders (4 percent), and other sources (17 percent). Among those who had heard of the ICC, 94 percent supported its involvement in response to the atrocities in Northern Uganda.
**Forgotten Voices: A Population-Based Survey of Attitudes About Peace and Justice in Northern Uganda**

### Table 9: How did you hear about the ICC?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Gulu (n = 197)</th>
<th>Kitgum (n = 157)</th>
<th>Lira (n = 127)</th>
<th>Soroti (n = 179)</th>
<th>Total (n = 660)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From friends and family member</td>
<td>26 (13%)</td>
<td>35 (22%)</td>
<td>14 (11%)</td>
<td>20 (11%)</td>
<td>95 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Acholi religious leaders</td>
<td>12 (6%)</td>
<td>8 (5%)</td>
<td>5 (4%)</td>
<td>3 (2%)</td>
<td>28 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Acholi traditional leaders</td>
<td>9 (5%)</td>
<td>9 (6%)</td>
<td>6 (5%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>24 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From the government</td>
<td>24 (12%)</td>
<td>19 (12%)</td>
<td>31 (24%)</td>
<td>28 (16%)</td>
<td>102 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From the media</td>
<td>97 (49%)</td>
<td>72 (46%)</td>
<td>104 (82%)</td>
<td>144 (80%)</td>
<td>417 (63%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>62 (32%)</td>
<td>36 (23%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>10 (6%)</td>
<td>109 (17%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Respondent could state more than one response. Percentages and totals are based on number of respondents. Average Sampling Error is +/-3 Percentage Points.

Of those who had knowledge of the ICC, a large majority (91 percent) said that the Court would contribute to achieving peace in Northern Uganda. Similarly, 89 percent said the ICC would provide justice for past abuses. Eighty-three percent believed that the Court had the authority and capacity to arrest members of the LRA, which may explain the high level of support.

A few more results could contribute to the discussion as to how and where the ICC should operate in Uganda. Ninety-one percent said that Court should involve Ugandans in the justice process. Of these, 31 percent believed Ugandans should serve as judges, witnesses (25 percent), experts (20 percent), and lawyers (13 percent). Forty-two percent of the 2,547 respondents said trials should be held in Uganda, while 35 percent chose abroad and 16 percent pointed to the northern region of Uganda.

### Relationship Between Peace and Justice

Respondents were asked which one of the following two options they would prefer: (1) peace with amnesty or (2) peace with trials and punishment. While the perceived relationship between peace and justice remains difficult to assess in a study such as this one, the question was intended to test comparative views on trials and amnesty in situations where peace is a given. Overall, a little more than half (53 percent) chose “peace with trials and punishment.” When compared between the Acholi and non-Acholi districts and gender, the responses were statistically different. Respondents from the non-Acholi districts were twice as likely to want “peace with trials and punishment” than “peace with amnesty” (Odds Ratio = 1.98, 95% C.I. = 1.69, 2.53) compared to those from the Acholi districts. In addition, females were 50 percent more likely than males to want “peace with trials and punishment” (Odds Ratio = 1.49, 95% CI = 1.24, 1.70). There was no difference in response with respect to educational level and exposure to the 11 traumatic events.
The difference in attitudes among Acholi and non-Acholi is further demonstrated when respondents were questioned about whether they think that pursuing justice now may endanger the peace process. This question was only asked to those that had knowledge about the ICC’s work in Uganda (678 of all respondents). Overall, a majority (61 percent) of this group do not believe that pursuing justice now would endanger the peace process. However, the responses were significantly different across the four districts. Gulu was the only district where a majority believed that pursuing justice would endanger the peace process (56 percent). In the two non-Acholi districts (Sorito and Lira), more than three-quarters (79 percent and 76 percent, respectively) of those who knew about the ICC did not believe that pursuing justice would endanger the peace process.

Respondents who believed that pursuing justice would endanger the peace process were also asked when, if ever, justice should be pursued. More than one-third (38 percent) believed it should be pursued when there was peace, and 21 percent answered within the next 6 months. Twelve percent said within a year, and 9 percent said within two years. Ten percent said they did not know. In Gulu and Kitgum, less than 5 percent of the respondents said that justice should never be addressed. The figures are even lower for Lira and Soroti (0 and 2.5 percent, respectively).

Forty-three percent of the respondents mentioned that the Ugandan government is critical to bringing about peace. Twenty-six percent of the respondents said that the international community was necessary. Ten percent believed that the traditional and religious leaders are essential. Sixty-two percent said that these various actors were committed to the process.
Table 10: Who are the main actors that would need to take action to bring peace to the region?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Gulu (n = 623)</th>
<th>Kitgum (n = 637)</th>
<th>Lira (n = 656)</th>
<th>Soroti (n = 647)</th>
<th>Total (n = 2,563)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ugandan government</td>
<td>218 (35%)</td>
<td>308 (48%)</td>
<td>227 (35%)</td>
<td>344 (53%)</td>
<td>1,097 (43%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan government</td>
<td>13 (2%)</td>
<td>14 (2%)</td>
<td>3 (1%)</td>
<td>14 (2%)</td>
<td>44 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acholi traditional and religious leaders</td>
<td>116 (19%)</td>
<td>82 (13%)</td>
<td>38 (6%)</td>
<td>12 (2%)</td>
<td>248 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees (former LRA)</td>
<td>16 (3%)</td>
<td>12 (2%)</td>
<td>13 (2%)</td>
<td>6 (1%)</td>
<td>47 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>78 (13%)</td>
<td>41 (6%)</td>
<td>3 (1%)</td>
<td>14 (2%)</td>
<td>136 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International community</td>
<td>111 (18%)</td>
<td>112 (18%)</td>
<td>296 (45%)</td>
<td>137 (21%)</td>
<td>656 (26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community, people themselves</td>
<td>31 (5%)</td>
<td>19 (3%)</td>
<td>1 (0.2%)</td>
<td>45 (7%)</td>
<td>96 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>29 (5%)</td>
<td>44 (7%)</td>
<td>65 (10%)</td>
<td>70 (11%)</td>
<td>208 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>11 (2%)</td>
<td>5 (1%)</td>
<td>10 (2%)</td>
<td>5 (1%)</td>
<td>31 (1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Respondent could provide more than one response. Percentages and totals are based on number of respondents. Average Sampling Error is +/-3 Percentage Points.

Truth Telling and Remembrance

Transitional justice mechanisms such as truth telling, remembrance, and other victim-oriented measures are not usually included in the debate about justice in Northern Uganda. Nonetheless, the survey endeavored to elicit views on these topics.

The majority of the respondents (84 percent) said that the population of Northern Uganda should remember the legacy of past abuses. The three top rationales for remembrance were to honor the victims (44 percent), prevent the violence from happening again (36 percent), and establish a historical record (22 percent). Fifty-one percent said remembrance should take place through an official day. One-third (34 percent) said the past should be remembered through books and other documents. One-quarter (26 percent) felt that remembrance should take the form of memorials, 17 percent preferred films, and 17 percent chose history education in schools.

Twenty-eight percent had knowledge about the work of truth commissions in other countries, such as Sierra Leone and South Africa. However, almost everyone (92 percent) agreed that a truth-telling process was needed in Uganda. Ninety percent said that there was a need for reconciliation both in Northern Uganda and in the country as a whole.

A majority of respondents (81 percent) indicated that they wanted to talk openly to someone about what had happened to them. Forty-three percent said that they would speak to anyone about their ordeals. Twenty-six percent specifically named the government, while 9 percent said religious leaders and 6 percent chose traditional leaders.
Table 11: To whom would you want to talk openly about what has happened to you?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gulu (n = 513)</th>
<th>Kitgum (n = 552)</th>
<th>Lira (n = 512)</th>
<th>Soroti (n = 461)</th>
<th>Total (n = 2,038)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anyone</td>
<td>120 (23%)</td>
<td>151 (27%)</td>
<td>311 (61%)</td>
<td>299 (65%)</td>
<td>881 (43%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional leaders</td>
<td>62 (12%)</td>
<td>44 (8%)</td>
<td>15 (3%)</td>
<td>6 (1%)</td>
<td>127 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
<td>72 (14%)</td>
<td>37 (7%)</td>
<td>44 (9%)</td>
<td>20 (4%)</td>
<td>173 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp leaders</td>
<td>41 (8%)</td>
<td>41 (7%)</td>
<td>14 (3%)</td>
<td>5 (1%)</td>
<td>101 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>123 (24%)</td>
<td>130 (24%)</td>
<td>143 (28%)</td>
<td>127 (28%)</td>
<td>523 (26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>83 (16%)</td>
<td>96 (17%)</td>
<td>53 (10%)</td>
<td>3 (1%)</td>
<td>235 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those involved in the peace process</td>
<td>42 (8%)</td>
<td>38 (7%)</td>
<td>57 (11%)</td>
<td>31 (7%)</td>
<td>168 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International community</td>
<td>21 (4%)</td>
<td>16 (3%)</td>
<td>92 (18%)</td>
<td>13 (3%)</td>
<td>142 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>89 (17%)</td>
<td>77 (14%)</td>
<td>29 (6%)</td>
<td>44 (10%)</td>
<td>239 (12%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Respondent could provide more than one response. Percentages and totals are based on number of respondents. Average Sampling Error is +/-3 Percentage Points.

Other Victim-oriented Measures

When asked what should be done for the victims of the conflict in Northern Uganda, the majority of respondents said they should be provided with some form of reparations. Fifty-two percent said victims should be provided with financial compensation. Forty percent mentioned foods, 26 percent wanted education, 26 percent chose counseling, and 17 percent mentioned cattle and goats. Eight percent of the respondents said justice, 9 percent chose apologies, and 6 percent mentioned reconciliation. When asked whether these measures should be done for the individual victim or the community as a whole, the majority (58 percent) of the respondents said that they could be taken in respect of the community as opposed to individual victims.
Forgotten Voices: A Population-Based Survey of Attitudes About Peace and Justice in Northern Uganda

Table 12: What should be done for the victims of violence in Northern Uganda?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gulu (n = 620)</th>
<th>Kitgum (n = 638)</th>
<th>Lira (n = 657)</th>
<th>Soroti (n = 642)</th>
<th>Total (n = 2,557)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>21 (3%)</td>
<td>35 (6%)</td>
<td>110 (17%)</td>
<td>25 (4%)</td>
<td>191 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apologies</td>
<td>72 (12%)</td>
<td>50 (8%)</td>
<td>52 (8%)</td>
<td>45 (7%)</td>
<td>219 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconciliation</td>
<td>39 (6%)</td>
<td>27 (4%)</td>
<td>41 (6%)</td>
<td>41 (6%)</td>
<td>148 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide them with financial compensation</td>
<td>278 (45%)</td>
<td>293 (46%)</td>
<td>417 (64%)</td>
<td>338 (52%)</td>
<td>1,326 (52%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide them with food</td>
<td>222 (36%)</td>
<td>258 (40%)</td>
<td>335 (51%)</td>
<td>211 (33%)</td>
<td>1,026 (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide education for their children</td>
<td>133 (21%)</td>
<td>136 (21%)</td>
<td>296 (45%)</td>
<td>110 (17%)</td>
<td>675 (26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide counseling</td>
<td>92 (15%)</td>
<td>115 (18%)</td>
<td>343 (52%)</td>
<td>102 (16%)</td>
<td>652 (26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensate them with cattle and goats</td>
<td>44 (7%)</td>
<td>66 (10%)</td>
<td>223 (34%)</td>
<td>104 (16%)</td>
<td>437 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any needed assistance</td>
<td>186 (30%)</td>
<td>182 (29%)</td>
<td>41 (6%)</td>
<td>126 (20%)</td>
<td>535 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>21 (3%)</td>
<td>13 (2%)</td>
<td>5 (1%)</td>
<td>15 (2%)</td>
<td>54 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>197 (32%)</td>
<td>196 (31%)</td>
<td>57 (9%)</td>
<td>138 (22%)</td>
<td>588 (23%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Respondent could state more than one response. Percentages and totals are based on number of respondents. Average Sampling Error is +/-3 Percentage Points.

The views on who best represents the victims were relatively diverse. The government was the most frequently cited answer, especially in the non-Acholi districts. But even in Gulu and Kitgum, where it is often claimed that the government is not widely supported, roughly 30 percent of the respondents claimed it was best at representing the views of the victims. Nearly 20 percent mentioned NGOs as the best representation of the victims.
Table 13: Who do you think best represents the views of the victims?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Gulu (n = 619)</th>
<th>Kitgum (n = 640)</th>
<th>Lira (n = 655)</th>
<th>Soroti (n = 644)</th>
<th>Total (n = 2,558)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional leaders</td>
<td>86 (14%)</td>
<td>66 (10%)</td>
<td>19 (3%)</td>
<td>4 (1%)</td>
<td>175 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
<td>100 (16%)</td>
<td>75 (12%)</td>
<td>71 (11%)</td>
<td>59 (9%)</td>
<td>305 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda government</td>
<td>181 (30%)</td>
<td>185 (29%)</td>
<td>254 (39%)</td>
<td>355 (55%)</td>
<td>973 (38%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International community</td>
<td>51 (8%)</td>
<td>57 (9%)</td>
<td>154 (24%)</td>
<td>30 (5%)</td>
<td>292 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amnesty Commission</td>
<td>27 (4%)</td>
<td>23 (4%)</td>
<td>63 (10%)</td>
<td>4 (1%)</td>
<td>117 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
<td>13 (2%)</td>
<td>5 (1%)</td>
<td>120 (18%)</td>
<td>12 (2%)</td>
<td>150 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>72 (12%)</td>
<td>79 (12%)</td>
<td>200 (31%)</td>
<td>141 (22%)</td>
<td>492 (19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>28 (5%)</td>
<td>15 (2%)</td>
<td>19 (3%)</td>
<td>10 (2%)</td>
<td>72 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp leaders</td>
<td>53 (9%)</td>
<td>139 (22%)</td>
<td>34 (5%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>226 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No one</td>
<td>13 (2%)</td>
<td>6 (1%)</td>
<td>6 (1%)</td>
<td>39 (6%)</td>
<td>64 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>169 (27%)</td>
<td>166 (26%)</td>
<td>55 (8%)</td>
<td>71 (11%)</td>
<td>461 (18%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Respondent could provide more than one response. Percentages and totals are based on number of respondents. Average Sampling Error is +/-3 Percentage Points.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Peace and justice will be achieved in Northern Uganda only through an inclusive process that involves a wide range of stakeholders, including victims, bystanders, and perpetrators. It means consulting widely and broadly on the feasibility and applicability of transitional justice measures and, most of all, giving those most affected by the violence a voice in the process. This report seeks to represent the forgotten voices of Northern Uganda. To this end, we offer the following summary findings, conclusions and recommendations:

- **The levels of exposure to violence in Northern Uganda are extremely high.** The people of Northern Uganda have been exposed to extremely high levels of violence. Of the 2,585 respondents, 40 percent had been abducted by the LRA, 45 percent had witnessed the killing of a family member, and 23 percent had been physically mutilated at some point during the conflict. The extent of the violence, as well as the complex background to the conflict, suggest that any transitional justice strategy should serve multiple purposes, not simply punishing those most responsible for massive human rights abuses, but also revealing the truth about what happened, helping to rebuild communities, and recognizing victims’ suffering.

So far, transitional justice mechanisms, such as truth-telling processes and reparations programs, have not been central to the debate about peace and justice in Northern Uganda. Yet, our survey found support exists for such concepts. A
majority of respondents (84 percent) thought it was important to remember the legacy of human rights violations in Northern Uganda. The three top rationales for remembrance were to honor the victims (44 percent), prevent it from happening again (36 percent), and record history (22 percent). A majority of respondents said they wanted to speak publicly about what had happened to them (81 percent). In addition, many respondents supported measures for victims, including financial compensation (52 percent) and food (40 percent), education for children (26 percent), counseling (26 percent), and compensation with cattle and goats (17 percent). Many were receptive to rebuilding the community (58 percent), rather than only compensating individuals (42 percent).

- **Immediate needs and concerns include peace and food.** The war between the Ugandan government and the LRA, now in its nineteenth year, has taken a horrible toll, both socially and psychologically, on the people of Northern Uganda. Survey respondents said the availability of food (34 percent) and sustained peace (31 percent) were their top priorities. These priorities do not mean that there is no desire for justice, but the need for food and peace is far more pressing.

- **Peace and justice are not seen as mutually exclusive.** Respondents viewed peace and justice as a complex relationship that was not necessarily mutually exclusive. Indeed, given the opportunity, many would like to have both. Overall, the majority, or about three-quarters (76 percent), of the respondents said that those responsible for abuses should be held accountable for their actions, and there existed a spectrum of opinion as to what should be done about violations committed during the conflict (see below on accountability). Those who had heard about the ICC (27 percent) expressed high levels of support. Also, when respondents were asked whether they would accept amnesty if it were the only road to peace, 29 percent still said no. Furthermore, many felt that some form of acknowledgement and/or retribution should be required of those granted amnesty. Respondents indicated that the Ugandan government and the international community were key actors in the areas of peace, accountability, and justice. Although traditional and religious leaders were mentioned less frequently, it must be noted that their initiatives in the area of peace and transitional justice, particularly in the case of traditional (as opposed to religious) leaders, have also been more recent.

- **Accountability for crimes committed by all sides to the conflict is a priority.** Seventy-six percent favored accountability for those LRA that had committed atrocities. Respondents were divided about what should happen to LRA rebels and others who were responsible for human rights violations. Respondents fell along a spectrum, favoring options ranging from punishment (trial, imprisonment, killing, 66 percent), to forgiveness, reconciliation and reintegration (22 percent), to confronting and/or confessing to the community (2 percent) and compensating victims (1 percent). Respondents expressed less desire to hold rank-and-file LRA accountable, as 58 percent of respondents said that this is not necessary. But accountability was not just framed in terms of the LRA. Most respondents (76 percent) said that UPDF members should be held accountable for their crimes.
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through trials (43 percent) or other forms of punishment, including imprisonment, dismissal, and demotion (33 percent).

- **The amnesty process is supported, but should be reformed.** Sixty-five percent of respondents support the amnesty process for LRA members. (Although this may seem inconsistent with the numbers that want accountability, it may be that respondents view amnesty mainly as an instrument for reintegrating combatants who are their own children, rather than as immunity from criminal prosecution.) However, only 4 percent of respondents said that amnesties should be granted unconditionally. The vast majority stated that some form of acknowledgement and/or retribution—confessing wrongdoing, apologizing to the victims and community, punishment, and/or compensation to victims—should be required of all those granted amnesty. More respondents supported amnesties for rank-and-file LRA (58 percent) than for the LRA leadership. More respondents (79 percent) also said that they would be willing to accept lower-ranking LRA back into the community, although the number that said they would accept LRA leadership is also relatively high (65 percent). Again, this may include the respondents’ own children. These figures again suggest that a multifaceted transitional justice process—one that embraces trials, limited amnesties, truth telling, reparations, reintegration, and community rebuilding—is needed in Northern Uganda.

- **Traditional and formal justice mechanisms are poorly understood.** Thirty-six percent of respondents said that the national court system, which is not often mentioned as part of the justice debate, was the most appropriate institution to deal with human rights abuses in Northern Uganda. However, only 25 percent said they were familiar with it. Knowledge of traditional justice ceremonies was markedly higher in Acholi areas (55 percent) than in non-Acholi areas (19 percent), but there was a diversity of opinions as to whether respondents considered these as useful in dealing with the LRA. These figures suggest that education and outreach programs need to be developed and implemented to inform the people of Northern Uganda about the possible components of a future transitional justice process. In this regard, education must be synonymous with community participation: Northern Ugandans must become engaged participants in—and not merely auxiliaries to—any transitional justice process in the region.

- **Expectations regarding the ICC.** The majority of respondents (73 percent) knew nothing or very little about the ICC’s existence and work. But of those who had heard of the court (27 percent), a majority attached high expectations to it, believing that the court would contribute both to peace (91 percent) and justice (89 percent). Out of this group, most (61 percent) further stated that pursuing justice now would not endanger the peace process, albeit with a significant difference of opinion between Acholi and non-Acholi, and 42 percent specified that they want it pursued within the next two years. In addition, more respondents preferred trials to be held in Uganda (58 percent) than abroad (35 percent).

The following recommendations stem from three observations emanating from the findings of the survey. First, to some degree, all of the entities involved in policy questions around peace and transitional justice in Northern Uganda—the Ugandan government, traditional and religious leaders, and the ICC—could ensure more
consultation with those most affected by the violence to ensure that their needs and expectations are reflected in these policies.

Second, the peace-versus-justice debate in Northern Uganda has become unnecessarily polarized over the controversy surrounding the ICC, and is often put unnecessarily into stark terms, posing peace and justice as alternatives. Indeed, the way forward in Northern Uganda should be driven by a comprehensive strategy that integrates the strengths of all mechanisms—formal and traditional—aimed at bringing peace and justice to the region. For this to succeed it will be necessary to draw policymakers away from the tendency to assess these issues in either/or terms. Furthermore, most of the debate has focused on the Acholi. While the Acholi form the vast majority of the victims of the conflicts, neighboring areas have also been dramatically affected.

Finally, time is of the essence. The people of Northern Uganda have suffered for far too long. The international community must become more actively involved in the peace process and in supporting the development of a transitional justice process in the region.

1. **To the International Community:** Facilitate a series of meetings involving local, national, and international stakeholders to develop an integrated and comprehensive strategy for peace and justice in Northern Uganda. A real danger exists that the current debate of peace versus justice will revert into one of competing, alternative options that divides talents and resources, rather than uniting them around a set of common goals. This demonstrates the need for enhanced dialogue between stakeholders and, potentially, a series of meetings. The mechanisms currently suggested are likely to function simultaneously, and an integrated approach will be needed to ensure their complementarity. There is also a need to conduct further population-based surveys in Northern Uganda to determine how attitudes about peace and justice evolve over time. The international community should support further initiatives.

2. **To the Ugandan Government:** Reform the amnesty process so that it is more inclusive and better meets victims' expectations. Survey respondents expressed a level of support for the work of the Amnesty Commission, but they also said some form of acknowledgement and/or retribution—confessing wrongdoing, apologizing to the victims and the community, punishment, and/or compensation to victims—should be required of those granted amnesty. These elements are key to successfully reintegrating former LRA members into the community. The amnesty process could be expanded to include truth-telling mechanisms, measures for commemoration of victims, and reparations for harm suffered.

3. **To Local Leaders:** Increase consultation capabilities so that the views and opinions of constituents can be better integrated into policies aimed at achieving peace and justice. The research indicates that there is public support for certain local initiatives, such as the amnesty process. However, views on the suitability of traditional justice ceremonies for dealing with violations committed by the LRA are less sanguine. Local leaders have a crucial role to play in guiding the process of peaceful reintegration of postwar communities, but they must do so in close consultation with their constituencies.
4. To the International Criminal Court: Implement an outreach strategy that fosters greater awareness among Ugandans of the court’s mandate and mode of operations. This effort should aim to disseminate more information about the Court and engage the public in dialogue. Such a strategy should also seek to manage the expectations of victims, many of whom believe the ICC can deliver more than it is able. As part of such a strategy, the Court should establish a presence in the North so that people will have regular access to ICC staff. Finally, the ICC should consider holding trials in situ to increase public access to its proceedings.
# Annexes

## ANNEX 1  List of Camps and Sub-counties Sampled

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gulu District</th>
<th>Kitgum District</th>
<th>Lira District</th>
<th>Soroti District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Keyo Camp</td>
<td>Amida Camp</td>
<td>Abia Camp</td>
<td>Moru Apesur Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awer Camp</td>
<td>Lokung Camp</td>
<td>Aleptong Camp</td>
<td>Swaria Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koch Goma Camp</td>
<td>Mucwini Camp</td>
<td>Aloi Rhino Camp</td>
<td>Katine Subcounty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parabongo Camp</td>
<td>Nam-Okora Camp</td>
<td>Aromo Camp</td>
<td>Kateta Subcounty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pabbo Camp</td>
<td>Palabek Camp</td>
<td>Barr Camp</td>
<td>Bungondo Subcounty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alokolum Camp</td>
<td>Kitgum Municipality</td>
<td>Agweng Camp</td>
<td>Soroti Municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palenga Camp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paicho Camp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pagak Camp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulu Municipality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX 2  Historical Background

Uganda has been independent since 1962, and its first government was led by President Milton Obote. In 1971, Obote was overthrown by Colonel Idi Amin, then-commander in the Ugandan army. During the late 1970s, as national and international disaffection for Amin’s regime grew, a number of antigovernment groups joined forces in Tanzania and conspired to overthrow Amin in 1979.54 In 1980, Milton Obote briefly returned to power (Obote II). The Amin and Obote II regimes are notorious for their legacy of political violence and human rights violations, which, under both regimes, saw more than 300,000 killings.

Both regimes changed after independence. Uganda has been marred by vengeful violence, roughly along ethnic lines, which exacerbated tensions between the north and south. For example, because of a “divide and rule” policy of the British colonial regime, the army was dominated by the northern Acholi group.55 In one notorious incident, Idi Amin, who was from the West Nile, ordered soldiers who had served in Obote’s government into the barracks and killed many of them before going on to exact revenge against unarmed civilians in Acholi and Lango districts.56

Prompted by perceived election fraud, during 1981, then-president Yoweri Museveni formed the National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M) and began an antigovernment insurgency.57 Fighting between the NRA and the UNLA (the national army) then ensued, largely in the Luweero region. The number of casualties, especially civilian, and what actually transpired in the “Luweero triangle” is still disputed. Under the NRA insurgency’s increased pressure, the Obote II government lost its grip on power and, in July 1985, was overthrown by UNLA officers. The coup was led by General Tito Okello Lutwa, who then became president. Shortly thereafter, Daniel Arap Moi, then-president of Kenya, brokered a peace and power-sharing agreement between the NRA and the UNLA in Nairobi. In January 1986, the NRA unilaterally abrogated the Nairobi agreement, just one month after it was implemented, and captured Kampala.58 Yoweri Museveni became president and the UNLA retreated north into Acholi areas and into Sudan.

55 Doom and Vlassenroot, supra note 13 at 7–8; “Behind the Violence,” supra note 16 at 10. The British regime reportedly favored northern groups for the military and southern groups to fill the civil service.
56 “Behind the Violence,” supra note 13 at 8.
57 Id. at 8.
58 Id. at 12.
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Origins of the Lord’s Resistance Army

In the period since Museveni took power in 1986, there have been 14 separate insurgencies in Uganda. The northern conflict dates to 1986, and went through several distinct phases before it became the LRA. The fighting in Northern Uganda originally began as a military insurgency, led by the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) in March 1986. The UPDA’s members were well-trained army officers, consisting of former UNLA soldiers and Acholi politicians. In 1987, the government reached out to the UPDA and extended a first amnesty to anyone who abandoned the armed struggle. This was the beginning of a process that culminated in a peace agreement with the UPDA, the Gulu Peace Accord, in June 1988.

However, on its heels followed another rebellion, known as the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) of Alice Auma Lakwena. This rebellion sought to energize the northern Acholi society and restore the imbalance and disorder caused by the violence they faced, particularly from UPDA and NRA fighting. In this sense, Lakwena’s rebellion marked a new phase in the fighting in Northern Uganda because it introduced a spiritual dimension. A folk hero, Lakwena claimed to possess special powers that would protect her soldiers when going into battle. In her first attacks, Lakwena achieved two “stunning victories.” Despite this initial success, the HSM suffered increasing losses in 1987, ending with its final defeat in November 1987, outside of the main town of Jinja, some 50 miles from Kampala. Lakwena escaped and ended up in a refugee camp in Kenya, where she remains today. Afterward, the HSM was briefly led by Lakwena’s father, Severino Likoya Kiberu, before the movement terminated in 1989.

Both the Lakwena and UPDA uprisings were popular in the local community, and succeeded in mobilizing the population’s grievances toward the new government. These included a fear of revenge from the new regime for the perceived responsibility of Acholi soldiers in the massacres in Luwero; feelings of betrayal arising from Museveni’s breach of the Nairobi power-sharing agreement; fears that the north would be politically marginalized by Museveni’s government, seen as dominated by persons originating from West Nile; and a general perception that grievances would be addressed by violence.

59 Id. at 4.
60 Doom and Vlassenroot, supra note 13 at 14, “Behind the Violence,” supra note 16 at 5, Gersony, supra note 54 at 25.
61 Gersony, supra note 54 at 26, Doom and Vlassenroot, supra note 13 at 15–16, “Behind the Violence,” supra note 16 at 5.
62 “The Hidden War: The Forgotten People, War in Acholiland and its Ramifications for Peace and Security in Uganda,” Kampala: Human Rights and Peace Centre (HURIPEC), Faculty of Law, Makerere University, 2003, at 37, refers to Lakwena’s movement as a response to the Acholi notion of pina rac: “when the whole thing is out of hand, that the entire apparatus of the culture cannot cope with the menace any more.”
63 See Gersony, supra note 54 at 24: Lakwena claims to have “channeled messages from the spirit of an Italian World War I veteran who had died at age 95 and was buried near Murchison Falls. According to Alice, after a 40-day immersion in the Nile, she was moved to advise the UPDA on its resistance operations.” See Doom and Vlassenroot, supra note 13 at 16–18, for an in-depth discussion of Lakwena’s spiritual views.
64 Id. at 26.
65 “Behind the Violence,” supra note 16 at 5.
ANNEX 3  The Amnesty Act of 2000

The amnesty process in Uganda was prompted by the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ALPI), culminating in the Amnesty Act of 2000. Although it was originally suggested to deal only with Northern Uganda, a national consultation revealed that there was a desire for countrywide, unrestricted application. This led to the term “blanket amnesty,” even though it requires an individualized application procedure before an Amnesty Commission. Its origins are unique compared to amnesty laws in other situations, as it is based on a consultation among victimized populations. A report by the Refugee Law Project shows that the Amnesty Act continues to enjoy broad popular support in the north, even though the process of reintegrating the perpetrators in the community is not as straightforward as sometimes claimed.

The Preamble of the Act, in itself a short piece of legislation, refers to “the expressed desire of the people of Uganda to end armed hostilities, reconcile with those who have caused suffering and rebuild their communities.” The Act defines Amnesty as “a pardon, forgiveness, exemption or discharge from criminal prosecution or any other form of punishment by the State.” The Amnesty applies in respect of any Ugandan who has at any time since the 26th day of January, 1986 engaged in or is engaged in war or armed rebellion against the government of the Republic of Uganda by (a) actual participation in combat; (b) collaborating with the perpetrators of the war or armed rebellion; (c) committing any other crime in the furtherance of the war or armed rebellion; or (d) assisting or aiding the conduct or prosecution of the war or armed rebellion.

This applies, effectively, to all types of activity relating to the conflict and is very broad. The concept is to entice combatants to leave insurgencies without fearing prosecution, with the aim of ending the rebellion. Some argue that, given Uganda’s violent history, an act of reconciliation like this is necessary to break the cycle of violence.

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66 “Whose Justice?,” supra note 5 at 12.
67 Id. This report was based on qualitative research, through interviews of about 409 people in Gulu, Kitgum, Pader, Arua, Kasese, Mbale, and Kampala. Around 166 of the interviewees were reporters. The report contains an analysis of the role of amnesties in conflicts in Kasese and West Nile, to extrapolate lessons for the conflict in the North. In those experiences, uneven distribution of reintegration packages among ex-combatants on the one hand, and lack of reparations to victims, proved to be some of the most problematic aspects of the amnesty process. Reporters were angered by the government’s failure to follow through, and some threatened to return to the bush. There was a sense that ex-combatants had simply been “bought out of the bush” through cash incentives but without an addressing of the root causes (see 18). But overall, many interviewees believed that the amnesty process had significantly contributed to increased security in West Nile and Kasese.
68 Amnesty Act 2000 s. 3(1).
69 Amnesty Act 2000 s. 3(2): A person referred to under subsection (1) shall not be prosecuted or subjected to any form of punishment for the participation in the war or rebellion for any crime committed in the cause of the war or armed rebellion (emphasis added).
In order to benefit from the amnesty, combatants may report to any of a number of central or local authorities\(^\text{70}\) and “renounce or abandon involvement in the war or rebellion; surrender[s] at any place or to any such authority or person any weapon in his or her possession.”\(^\text{71}\) When they do, they become “reporters” and their file is then referred to the Amnesty Commission, which may requires further information, such as when the individual joined the insurgency. This is basically a paper process, but an oral interview may be conducted to verify information. However, the Amnesty Commission does not have an investigative capacity to cross-check information. Reporters are then issued with a Certificate of Amnesty. It is important to note that these declarations are not onerous, and a combatant need not specify the crime for which he or she benefits from amnesty. Also, the amnesty can effectively function as a pardon for persons against whom charges are already pending, as long as the charges relate to conduct that qualifies under the Act.

As mentioned, the Act also establishes an Amnesty Commission, led by a Chairman who is a judge of the High Court, and comprising six other members “of high moral integrity.” The Amnesty Commission has the duty to monitor programs of demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) of reporters, as well as to carry out sensitization. The Amnesty Commission generally seems to be perceived as an institution that functions well under challenging circumstances, including with inadequate funding. It seems to maintain good relationships with civil society. It tends to be regarded as efficient, and maintains a large database of reporters in Kampala, where trends are also analyzed. The Amnesty Commission has regional offices in Gulu, Kitgum, Arua, Kasese, and Mbale. In total, LRA have accounted for approximately 6,000 of the 14,000 reporters. (Many of the rest are from the West Nile rebellion.) There seems to be a trend of increase in the numbers of reporters per year,\(^\text{72}\) and a number of senior LRA commanders (including Banya and Sam Kolo) have availed themselves of the process. The amnesty does not apply to children under 12, who have no criminal responsibility.

The Amnesty Commission also has a broader mandate, both to “consider and promote appropriate reconciliation mechanisms in the affected areas,” “to promote dialogue and reconciliation within the spirit of the Act,” and to “perform any other function that is associated or connected with the execution of the functions stipulated in the Act.”\(^\text{73}\) The possibilities under these provisions remain underexplored, perhaps in part because, according to one commentator, when the Amnesty Act was passed, there was no “theory of amnesty.” But these provisions seem to leave open the possibilities of exploring an increased truth-seeking function for the Amnesty Commission, or links to traditional justice mechanisms. On the other hand, some fear that placing responsibility on combatants to disclose information about, or even participation in, crimes may have a chilling effect on LRA participation, as many may be reluctant to admit wrongdoing.

\(^\text{70}\) This may include the nearest Army or Police Unit, a Chief, a member of the Executive Committee of a local government unit, a magistrate or a religious leader within the locality: Amnesty Act 2000 s. 4(1).
\(^\text{71}\) Amnesty Act 2000 s. 4(1)(b), 4(1)(c).
\(^\text{72}\) Statistics provided to the ICTJ by the Amnesty Commission in March 2005 show that amnesty applications have been at their highest in 2004 and early 2005.
\(^\text{73}\) Amnesty Act 2000 s. 9(c), 9(d), 9(e).
Others argue that there should be more emphasis on truth telling by reporters and dialogue with the communities as part of the amnesty process, and that the current formula does not sufficiently encompass the victims’ interests.74

Some of the challenges facing the Amnesty Commission include: (1) the uniqueness of the task, and the consequent lack of experience of commissioners and staff; (2) the mixed signals in terms of political support stemming from the president and high-ranking policy makers;75 (3) lack of sufficient funding and the degree of dependency on international donors, particularly for DDR programs;76 (4) reaching out to the target audience, even if they are abroad. In this regard, the Commission has done radio outreach and held workshops and seminars for “messengers.”77

It is often said that the amnesty process accords with Acholi traditions, but is also supported by a religious rationale. Amnesty hinges on a conception of reconciliation, which has been promoted by Uganda’s religious leaders. For example, Archbishop Odema argues that the Acholi are like a family who has been divided, rejected, and estranged. Because the LRA have been rejected, they have to be accepted back. He argues that they are willing to acknowledge wrongdoing, although not necessarily in public. The Archbishop argues that acceptance has to precede a resolution of the conflict and that indications that it is forthcoming will entice perpetrators to return and to change their attitudes. Religious leaders acknowledge that this is difficult for victims, but note that forgiveness is a liberating experience and that “the truth will set you free.” The example of Bishop Ochola (a prominent member of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative) is a striking example. His wife was killed by a landmine planted by the rebels, and yet he was motivated to work for peace and the restoration of broken relationships.

A main weakness of the current amnesty process is in ensuring adequate reintegration opportunities. The Act also provides for the establishment of a Demobilization and Resettlement Team. Reporters are provided with packages that include blankets, mattresses, utensils, and some food and agricultural instruments. Monitoring is supposed to be up to two years. However, the general approach to reintegration in Northern Uganda is uncoordinated and poorly funded, with few longer-term programs. Also, returning to the communities is hindered by displacement levels. There are individual reception and rehabilitation centers that do very admirable work, run by organizations such as IRC, GUSCO, World Vision, the Belgian government (Rachele Rehabilitation Center), and CARITAS (in Pader). But these do not form part of a comprehensive strategy, and there is little sustained assistance and skills training available.

Other organizations specialize in sensitizing the communities and ensuring that former LRA will be accepted back peacefully, and will not be subject to retaliation. Concerned Parents Association and CARITAS have done targeted outreach in the communities to

74 See “Whose Justice,” supra note 5, recommendations.
75 See below.
76 The Commission is funded through the Ministry of Internal Affairs but remains under-funded. Donors have included the EU, the Netherlands, Ireland, and the UK (DFID).
77 Interview with the ICTJ, Gulu, March 29, 2005.
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remind people that these children were abducted and that communities failed to protect them. Nonetheless, senior LRA leaders are often kept in some form of protective custody by the UPDF and live in barracks. (This is probably also because they are able to provide useful information to the UPDF.)

There has also been much outreach to try to reassure LRA that they will not be the subjects of revenge killings. Returnees are often required to take part in government-organized outreach events. In Gulu, Radio FM Mega runs regular programs for returnees to call upon their former comrades to come out of the bush, and to offer reassurance that they have not been harmed. Nevertheless, serious questions remain regarding whether adequate incentives exist for LRA leaders to forsake their life in the bush, where they have access to material goods, social status, and power. For many, it is the only life they have known, and they lack skills to make a living doing anything other than fighting. Senior returnees often end up joining the UPDF. Finally, there have been instances of revenge killings, and the general willingness of communities to accept former LRA back in large numbers remains untested.78

As mentioned, another real difficulty for the amnesty process is the political ambiguity that surrounds it, which undermines the trust of combatants.79 It is said that President Museveni has never been very supportive of the amnesty process, and the financial support given to the Amnesty Commission has been inadequate. On several occasions, Museveni has said that he wants to amend it, in order to exclude the senior leadership of the LRA, even though this met with much resistance. The Amnesty Act requires renewal at six-month intervals (at the Minister’s discretion), thus depriving it from any sense of being a permanent arrangement. An erratic pattern of renewals has led to further insecurity, and uncertainty has also been created by the LRA’s designation as a terrorist organization. Yet another sign of ambiguity on behalf of the government has been its referral to the ICC.

78 The situation is particularly difficult in the case of children who are born in the bush and who return with their mothers. Often clans have been unwilling to accept these children as their own, but they cannot take on their father’s identity.

79 See “Whose Justice,” supra note 5, pt. IV.
ANNEX 4  Traditional Justice

Traditional leaders in Acholi areas have argued that Acholi traditional dispute-resolution or justice mechanisms should apply in the postconflict context. Before colonization, each clan of the Acholi tribe had a paramount chief (Rwot), and elders governed the subclans. Many of these elders were selected because of their wisdom in mediating disputes. The system of inherited chiefs was abolished and replaced by appointed chiefs during the colonial era, although many continued to operate informally. In 2000, many of the traditional leaders were reinstated through a civil society initiative. These included Rwot David Arcana II, now paramount chief of the Acholi tribe, and the Acholi Traditional Leaders Council. The traditional system essentially consults via representation at the family, village, subclan, and clan level. It is complemented by local administration. The traditional leaders have been extremely active in the peace process and enjoy the support of civil society. The resurgence of this leadership has given rise to new opportunities to return to traditional justice practices.

Acholi traditional conflict management is guided by the principle that “Acholi survival depends on unity.” The system is activated by an offender’s declaration of the wrong he or she has committed. This is especially important in cases requiring compensation, and the Acholi believe that no admission of guilt could lead to the person being plagued by the “living dead” through nightmares, visions, and misfortunes. In addition, there is no capital punishment, but instead a well-developed scheme of compensation that depends on the severity of the crime. This would be agreed between the clan of the offender, who accepted collective responsibility, and the clan of the victim, who would reciprocate with collective forgiveness. This would often be followed by a ceremony to indicate the resumption of the relationship between the clans.

Matters of jurisdiction in Acholi traditional society were complex and depended on where in society the conflict occurred (family, subclan, clan, interclan, intertribal), as well as the nature of the crime. The procedures were partly covered by bylaws that regulated matters such as the levels of compensations owed, taking into account whether the offense was committed accidentally or deliberately. Some of these bylaws are currently being codified.

Inherent to the process of dispute resolution is the identification of behavior that is “kir,” or taboo, in Acholi traditions. These behaviors may range from the criminal to the antisocial—violent acts, disputes over resources, and sexual misconduct—including behavior that would prevent the settlement of the dispute. A festering of “kir” can lead to a variety of misfortunes to be visited on the offender or his clan. Once identified, “kir”

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80 This summary relies mainly on, “Traditional ways of preventing and solving conflicts in Acholi,” Results of some secondary and primary research carried out by the Psychosocial Support Program, CARITAS, Gulu Archdiocese, Jan. 2005.
81 The 1965 Constitution abolished this system nationwide.
82 One major exception to this is the mob justice that has been practiced against those (mainly women) who are accused of inviting evil influences into the community. They are often summarily killed.
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must be cleansed through extensive rituals, which often constituted part of the reaffirmation of common communal values or behaviors.

Cleansing ceremonies are common, and are performed when an individual has spent significant time away from the community to ensure that he or she does not bring in foreign spirits. A common ritual involves stepping on a raw egg, which symbolizes something pure and untouched. Its shell has to be crushed, symbolic of the ways life outside crushes the life of the community. It cleanses the foreign elements that may otherwise come into the community and bring it misfortune. Other objects that accompany the ceremony are the “layibi,” the stick used for opening the granary (symbolizing that the individual is returning to eat where they he or she has eaten before) and a twig from the opobo tree, traditionally used to make soap (symbolizing cleansing). This ritual is commonly used with LRA returnees. Sometimes this is followed by the “washing away the tears” ceremony, where the parents of a returning child slaughter a goat and water is poured on the thatched roof of the homestead where the child will live to symbolize the washing away of the tears shed over the child. (This is less common, as not many people can afford to slaughter a goat.)

Another well-known Acholi ceremony is the Mato Oput (drinking of the “bitter root”). This takes place within a clan or, in cases of wrongful killings or murder, between clans with a strong relationship, after the two parties have agreed to compensation and payment has been made. First, the murder is reported by the relatives of the offender or victim. Circumstances are discussed and compensation is decided upon (the entire clan of the offender is expected to contribute). The compensation has to be affordable, so as not to prevent the restoration of relations, and will usually consist of cattle or money. (In past times, compensation for murder often consisted of a girl given in marriage to the other clan, to give birth to new children for that clan.) During this process, the social relationship between the parties is considered suspended, and no meals or drink are taken together.

The handover of compensation is followed by a ceremony, presided over by the local chief (Rwot Moo). The roots of the oput tree are crushed into a calabash. Representatives from the perpetrator’s and victim’s clans kneel together, with their hands behind them and their foreheads touching, to drink the concoction. The bitter taste of the root symbolizes the nature of the crime and the loss of a life. Sometimes all members of a clan will drink (in pairs) until the juice is finished. This is followed by a meal, sometimes including cutting two goats into halves and swapping the halves. The elders remind everyone present not to promote antagonism. Only then can common activities (such as joint meals) resume. The absence of these common activities is seen as very serious and potentially dangerous.

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83 The Mato Oput was not usually applied to a killing that had occurred between enemies during war, which required a different cleansing ceremony. The essence of the Mato Oput is the restoration of relationships within or between friendly clans.
84 Again, the failure to report a crime is believed to give rise to misfortune or to being plagued by the “living dead.”
A third type of ceremony is “the bending of the spears,” performed to mark the end of a violent conflict between clans or tribes. This involves making vows that killings will not be repeated. Each clan bends a spear and gives it to the other. This implies that if either would consider a renewal of violence, this will “turn back on them.” If the conflict is between Acholi clans, this may be followed by the Mato Oput. Other purification ceremonies may be applied to ask ancestors and the gods for forgiveness or for further protection. These may be known as “tum,” and are used to rid the community of “kir.” A wide variety of these ceremonies exists for various types of wrongs, and many involve the slaughter of sheep or goats.

There has been much discussion on the potential use of these ceremonies for atrocities committed by the LRA. Despite the fact that the ceremony of Mato Oput is fairly well known (both within and outside of Uganda), it is no longer widely practiced. There are a number of grounds on which the application and relevance of ceremonies such as the Mato Oput are contested. Some have voiced doubt about the willingness of the communities to truly accept former LRA back, and they point to the relative absence of knowledge about the success of long-term reintegration. For example, religious leaders would contest the spiritualist elements of traditional justice, such as reliance on spirit mediums to contact the spirits of the dead. They consider certain parts of traditional justice “unchristian” or “unholy.” Some point out that traditionally, Mato Oput applies only to murder, and not to crimes such as rape or mutilation. In addition, Mato Oput can apply only where perpetrator and victim are both known, and some doubt the willingness of clans to accept responsibility for what the LRA has done. Some contest their current relevance, as they have been in disuse and many, especially younger generations, no longer see their value. At the same time, others describe them as “deeply embedded.” Some doubt whether traditional leaders will be able to oversee such justice ceremonies in the post-conflict context because the many other issues that are likely to arise when people return to their villages, such as conflicts over land. Others have expressed doubt that such ceremonies will be sufficient for the scale of atrocities committed by the LRA.

However, many argue that these traditional mechanisms constitute important channels for reconciliation and can and should be adapted. These traditions are mostly oral, and little written information exists. In order to allow for their adaptation, several groups are now making efforts to map these traditions, which may then allow for a systematic consideration of their suitability to provide an approach to dealing with Uganda’s legacy of human rights violations.
ANNEX 5  Uganda’s Legal System

The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda is the supreme law of Uganda, has binding force on all authorities and persons throughout Uganda, and prevails over any inconsistent law or custom.85

Civilian Judicial System

Courts of Judicature

The Courts of Judicature deals with regular civilian offenses and is composed of a hierarchy of four levels: the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, the High Court, and subordinate courts.86 The Supreme Court is the final court of appeal. It hears appeals from the Court of Appeal, the court of first instance in constitutional cases, and appellate court to the High Court. The High Court has unlimited original jurisdiction in all criminal and civil matters and serves as an appellate court from the subordinate courts. It conducts most business in Kampala, its headquarters, but also has seven circuits, including one in Gulu.87

The main subordinate courts are the Magistrates Courts, which comprises three levels: Chief Magistrates, Magistrates Grade I, and Magistrates Grade II. These courts handle the bulk of cases in Uganda. The Chief and Grade I Magistrates are lawyers, whereas Grade II Magistrates are currently lay judges. The different levels of Magistrates exercise judicial control over matters, as specified by law. Grade II Magistrates preside over the specialized Family and Children’s Courts. There are also Qadhi courts, competent to administer Islamic law on certain family law and inheritance issues, and specialized Land Tribunals, which derive their jurisdiction from a separate part of the Constitution.88

The jurisdiction of magistrates is confined to cases not carrying the death penalty as a maximum sentence. The chief magistrate alone can hear cases carrying a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. Grade I Magistrates can preside over any offense carrying a lesser sentence.89 The High Court, by implication, has exclusive jurisdiction over capital offense cases (e.g., those that carry the death penalty). The Ugandan government has introduced the International Criminal Court Bill of 2004 to give effect to the Rome Statue of the ICC. The bill provides, among others, that genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity involving the willful killing of a person are subject to the death penalty, whereas other crimes carry a maximum penalty of life imprisonment or less.90

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86 Id. See Chapter 8 for full description of powers and duties.
87 See www.judicature.go.ug/high_court.php.
88 See Constitution, art. 239, and Chapter 15 more generally.
89 Magistrates Courts Act, s. 161.
90 See the International Criminal Court Bill (2004), draft of April 19, 2004, s. 7–9.
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Local Courts

Below the district level, local citizens are represented within government by system of Local Councils (LC). At the village level (LC I), the Council chairs preside over an Executive Committee Court, which hears cases involving civil disputes and a few minor criminal offenses. The LC Courts are intended to reflect traditional practices in Uganda whereby a group of local peers tried minor offenses and the communities agreed on and passed the judgments. Cases decided by the LC I can be appealed up to the parish level court (LC II), then to the sub-county level court (LC III), and finally to the Magistrates Court. The LC system appears to have been replicated to some extent in the internal displacement camps.91

Uganda Human Rights Commission

The Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) is an independent Constitutional body established to protect and promote human rights. The functions of the UHRC include investigating allegations of abuse, performing research and education on human rights and the Ugandan Constitution, monitoring the government’s compliance with international obligations, and producing periodical reports on its findings. The UHRC’s commissioners sit as judges on a human rights tribunal, where they have the power, for example, to issue summons or make compensation orders for infringements of a human right or freedom.93 The government has reportedly never made any compensation payments because of “general budgetary constraints.”94

Access to Justice Hindered by the Conflict

Under normal circumstances, each sub-county has a Magistrates Court, meaning that many Ugandans live within about 5 km of a court.95 The costs of having recourse to the Magistrates Courts, however, are seen as prohibitive and many less serious cases are handled by the LC Courts because of litigants’ preferences.96 As of May 2004, there were only 9 lawyers outside of Kampala devoted full time to providing legal-aid services and 47 of Uganda’s 56 districts had no primary legal aid services.97 The UHRC has a regional office in Gulu, but only one officer for the whole northern region.

The conflict in Northern Uganda has greatly hindered the functioning of and access to rule of law institutions. The High Court circuit in Gulu has continued to be operational, but the insecurity in the region makes accessing that Court and Magistrates Courts quite treacherous. Any traveling outside of the internal displacement camps, even short

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91 See “Nowhere to Hide,” supra note 25 at 50.
92 See www.uhrc.org.
93 See the Constitution, s. 51–58, for more details on the UHRC’s powers and functions.
95 See JLOS Executive Summary at 33.
96 Id.
distances, can be perilous. Other services have also been greatly affected by the insecurity. For example, service providers have a hard time accessing the population, especially in the displacement camps; some organizations, such as the UHRC and other human rights organizations have trained paralegals in the camps, but they face the same security risks as the rest of the camp population; rule of law institutions, such as the Courts, the UHRC, and the police, are already overburdened and under-resourced, even without the added strain, and the immensity of legal issues presented by the conflict.

Military Law System

The court martial system deals with offenses committed by the army, the UPDF, under military law. The administration of military law is governed by the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces Act and its regulations. Under the Act, there is no provision for summary trials, thus even minor offenses are tried by a formal military court. The lowest court is the Unit Disciplinary Committee (UDC). There is one UDC for each army unit, and it can try almost all cases. The UDC can also impose any sentence under law, and may refer particularly complex cases to a higher court known as the Division Court Martial. The UPDF Act establishes a Field Court Martial which operates when it is not practicable for either the UDC or the Division Court Martial to hear a case.

The General Court Martial serves as an appellate body from the UDC and Division Court Martial and also has original jurisdiction over all matters of military law. The highest military court is the Court Martial Appeal Court, hearing appeals from the General Court Martial. As a final recourse, the President is granted a general Prerogative of Mercy power under Article 121 of the Constitution, and a similar power under Section 92 of the UPDF Act, which allows him to pardon unconditionally or reduce the sentence.

UPDF members have been tried before the military courts for violations and abuses against civilians on a number of key occasions. There have also been two notable cases before the UHRC for UPDF abuse, but again, no compensation has been paid to date. The High Court in Mukono has ruled that Local Defence Units, civilians defense units established by the government to provide protection in the displacement camps, are an integral part of the government machinery and, consequently, the Attorney-General is responsible for their acts of misconduct. In general, however, criminal prosecution, court martial and UHRC cases are reportedly rare.

98 See “UPDF Act,” Cap 307. Amendments to that bill have been introduced in the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces Bill, 2003, which has not yet gone before Parliament.
99 Except cases involving murder, manslaughter, rape and defilement, treason, terrorism and disobedience of lawful orders resulting in loss of life. UPDF Act, s. 77.
100 See www.defenceuganda.mil.ug/court_martial.php.
101 See UPDF Act, s. 78.
102 Id. at s. 81.
103 CSOPNU, “Nowhere to Hide,”at 84.
104 Human Rights Watch, at 13.
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ANNEX 6 Authors and Acknowledgements

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The International Center for Transitional Justice

The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) assists countries pursuing accountability for past mass atrocity or human rights abuse. The Center works in societies
emerging from repressive rule or armed conflict, as well as in established democracies where historical injustices or systemic abuse remain unresolved.

In order to promote justice, peace, and reconciliation, government officials and nongovernmental advocates are likely to consider a variety of transitional justice approaches including both judicial and nonjudicial responses to human rights crimes. The ICTJ assists in the development of integrated, comprehensive, and localized approaches to transitional justice comprising five key elements: prosecuting perpetrators, documenting and acknowledging violations through nonjudicial means such as truth commissions, reforming abusive institutions, providing reparations to victims, and facilitating reconciliation processes.

The Center is committed to building local capacity and generally strengthening the emerging field of transitional justice, and works closely with organizations and experts around the world to do so. By working in the field through local languages, the ICTJ provides comparative information, legal and policy analysis, documentation, and strategic research to justice and truth-seeking institutions, nongovernmental organizations, governments and others.

**The Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley**

Founded in 1994 with the assistance of The Sandler Family Supporting Foundation, U.C. Berkeley’s Human Rights Center is a unique interdisciplinary research and teaching enterprise that reaches across academic disciplines to conduct research in emerging issues in international human rights and humanitarian law. The Center complements and supports the work of nongovernmental human rights organizations by drawing upon the creativity and expertise of scholars from several diverse university programs and departments such as anthropology, demography, education, ethnic studies, geography, journalism, law, political science and public health.