Since Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the Ukrainian government and civil society organizations have been documenting atrocities and other war crimes and taking concrete steps to bring those responsible to justice. These efforts have only intensified since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, which has brought with it a massive increase in the number and scale of the crimes committed. So far, Ukraine’s Office of the Prosecutor General has initiated proceedings for over 240,000 violations. Meanwhile, the International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants for six Russian officials, including President Vladimir Putin, for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Despite this robust pursuit of accountability, Ukraine has yet to adopt an overarching national transitional justice policy, though there have been several past attempts to formalize one. A comprehensive transitional justice policy would, among other things, complement criminal prosecutions with reparations, truth-seeking and memorialization initiatives, as well as institutional reforms.
ICTJ strongly advocates for a holistic transitional justice vision for Ukraine as part of its programmatic activities. Leading this work is the head of ICTJ’s Ukraine program, Kateryna Busol, a Ukrainian lawyer and an associate professor at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. She is also the author of the new report, “Myths and Ways Forward: Transitional Justice for Ukraine," which makes the case for such a vision and offers stakeholders actionable recommendations to advance it. Busol recently sat down with ICTJ's Alexandra Del Biaggio to discuss the path toward holistic justice for Ukraine.
Alexandra Del Biaggio: In the new policy report, you set out to debunk five myths about transitional justice in Ukraine. What motivated you to take on this myth-busting approach?
Kateryna Busol: We were inspired by two publications from Chatham House that had done important work dispelling myths about Russia and the current aggression against Ukraine. In general, structurally, this is a wonderful approach, but I find it particularly relevant with respect to Ukraine and Russia, because Russia really weaponizes narratives.
This approach is relevant because certain myths about transitional justice are also prevalent globally. During our launches in Kyiv, Brussels, and London, we noticed that people had the same questions: Isn’t transitional justice something that applies only in situations of civil war or transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy? Is holistic justice something we only discuss after the full cessation of hostilities, and not during conflict? The whole ethos of the report—while it’s done by ICTJ's Ukraine program—is that we speak about myths but also transformative changes that are relevant both for survivors of Russia's atrocities in Ukraine, and for the wider survivor community and committed human rights practitioners working on holistic justice worldwide.
Alexandra Del Biaggio: Drawing on lessons from Syria and Colombia, you argue for the establishment of a transitional justice process in Ukraine now, during the war, rather than after it ends. How can such an initiative be implemented in practice, given security risks and political and institutional constraints related to the ongoing conflict?
Kateryna Busol: I want to start by saying how inspired we are—as jurists and as citizens of conflict-affected nations—by the people of Colombia, by Syrians, and by the Yazidi community, who are caught in between Iraq and Syria. I think it is first and foremost the willingness of survivors, the growing professionalization of the expert community on legal matters, and the technological expansion that cumulatively give us the perfect tools to be early responders. Most people have smartphones, so they can easily document bomb sites, abductions, and torture. They can then pass this information to a safe location, where it can be further translated into media coverage that will shed light on the atrocities, if not lead to criminal proceedings.
I love quoting Natia Navrouzov, the executive director of Yazda, the NGO advancing justice for the Yazidi community. She says that when you witness mass atrocities, you don’t think about legal concepts. Instead, you want to document them and share the information to ensure that at least some degree of justice is served.
Ukraine essentially mirrors this experience. Russia’s aggression started in 2014, not 2022. The level of international solidarity and attention was completely different during those first years. In many ways, we, as human rights lawyers on the ground, felt that nobody else would do this work, so we documented, supported national prosecutions, and sent communications to the International Criminal Court. We also started the discussion that justice for survivors is not just constrained by a court judgment. Our work also focused on ensuring access to health care, mental health support, counseling, and safe, dignified living conditions.
Now, with the full-scale invasion and the increased international solidarity, support, and attention, it is the perfect time to translate this into a more holistic, long-term vision. This includes continuing documentation and prosecutions, but also developing a vision for people living under prolonged occupation and in government-controlled territories to coexist and eventually reconcile.
This idea of holistic thinking is not accidental. It comes from the understanding that such complex matters of ongoing aggression and mass criminality cannot be resolved only through criminal justice proceedings, even when the affected government is willing and able to do so. In its action plan for 2026, the Ukrainian government has tasked one of its ministries with developing a transitional justice strategy. It’s encouraging that the government has also recognized the need for a comprehensive transitional justice response based on our previous work and attempts to formalize such a policy in Ukraine.
Alexandra Del Biaggio: The Ukrainian government has signaled that it is preparing to revitalize its vision of transitional justice. With that in mind, you advocate for a comprehensive victim-centered approach that addresses the full range of harms experienced by victims. Why do you believe adopting such an approach from the outset is so important?
Kateryna Busol: First, I will discuss the challenges and then explain why, while recognizing them, I still believe they should not prevent us from pursuing a holistic transitional justice vision in Ukraine. Some members of Ukraine’s human rights community are concerned that changes in the dynamics of Russia’s aggression might reshape the understanding we have among civilians on human rights and security matters. For instance, what would happen if a viable ceasefire were to leave a fifth of Ukraine under occupation? I think it is important for the policy to recognize that pivotal changes in the dynamics of the armed conflict might necessitate reconsidering certain approaches.
But all in all, the framework—including the pillars of transitional justice, the principles of intersectionality, gender competence, survivor-centricity, the best interests of the child—will be relevant for whatever measures, at whatever stage of the conflict. Thus, I think it should acknowledge the difficult circumstances under which it is being adopted and the fact that, indeed, it is going to be the first transitional justice policy adopted amidst an ongoing international armed conflict in order to address its consequences already. However, it should not overpromise.
Ukraine’s vision for transitional justice should do at least two things. First, it should name all the crucial pillars of transitional justice—criminal prosecutions, truth-seeking, reparations, memorialization, and guarantees of non-recurrence—and recognize that they are equal and mutually catalyzing. This would prevent people, for instance investigators who feel very dedicated to criminal proceedings, to get concerned that war crime cases are going to be dropped. They are not, and international law prohibits the non-prosecution of international crimes. But in the same vein, we should emphasize to Ukrainian society, the government, the survivor community, and the international community, that memorialization and reparations are crucially and equally important. It is not one over the other.
The second component is the importance of defining some key principles such as intersectionality and gender competence and explaining how they can inform both the prosecution of international crimes and serious human rights violations and the proposed redress. This would enable any related justice measures adopted on a state, regional, or local levels—obviously tailored to the realities of each region—to be rooted in a clear understanding of these principles.
Alexandra Del Biaggio: So far, Russian forces have committed thousands of atrocities, more than 240,000 of which are already subject to criminal proceedings. What can be done to address these crimes and support the victims in the near and intermediate terms?
Kateryna Busol: First, structurally, it is important for Ukraine to consider the Colombian experience more and move from the insular consideration of every incident to building macro cases and looking at patterns. Currently, Ukraine’s criminal procedure code essentially requires every crime to be registered in a separate proceeding. Given the volume of criminality but also crucially knowing how all these crimes are connected by a clear policy from the Russian Federation's military and senior political officials, uniting them in macro cases would allow to show the transcending policy behind them.
In terms of more practical support to survivors, urgent interim reparations are deeply needed. We know from the UN Secretary General and from UN guidelines on remedy and reparation that reparations should not wait until the end of hostilities or a full transition. Some survivors in particular require them as soon as possible due to the physical and mental trauma they have experienced. Survivors of conflict-related sexual violence, for instance, might require specialized urological and gynecological care as well as advice on reproductive health and on how to deal with children conceived out of the war crime of rape. Obviously, this cannot wait until the cessation of hostilities.
Ukraine has had a pilot project for a limited number of sexual violence survivors, but it must be expanded. The many survivors of sexual violence who come forward should be able to receive reparation. In terms of recognition and having at least basic support, knowing that the state and the international community care for them is important.
Moreover, the list of survivors eligible for these reparations should be expanded. It should not only include survivors of sexual violence; it should also include survivors of torture, enforced disappearances, and unlawful transfer and deportation. We cannot create hierarchies of harm and crime.
Finally, urgent interim reparations and any other reparative framework and the wider transitional justice framework must be applicable to all survivors not only since the full-scale invasion, but since the beginning of Russia’s aggression in 2014. I would say this is the primary holistic accountability step we should ensure, because it caters directly to the physical, mental, psychological, social, and housing needs of those who are most vulnerable.
Alexandra Del Biaggio: The Russian government has consistently framed transitional justice efforts in Ukraine as provocative, even claiming they could prompt a withdrawal from the Minsk Agreements, which ostensibly seek to end hostilities in the Donbas region. What impact does this narrative have on Ukraine’s justice efforts, and how can it be countered?
Kateryna Busol: The only impact Russia’s claims or demands for impunity have made is to push Ukraine—as a community of human rights defenders, as community of survivors, and as a state—to emphasize even more strongly that justice is non-negotiable.
Recent polling among the wider Ukrainian public shows that people demand criminal prosecutions, inclusive and nuanced memorialization, the search for the missing, and mental health support. While individuals don’t necessarily know the phrasing “transitional justice,” the measures they demand fall squarely within that framework.
For criminal accountability, the survivor community and the wider public have emphasized a two-pronged approach. First, accountability of direct perpetrators—the immediate people who raped, looted, or organized torture chambers—and their commanders. But crucially, and quite innovatively for the international legal framework, Ukraine brings added value by emphasizing the need for accountability of all Russian leadership for the underlying crime of aggression—designated as the supreme international crime at the Nuremberg trials.
In 2025, when details of an alleged peace plan—including, notably, an amnesty clause for international crimes—were leaked to the media, the Ukrainian community spoke out with a clear and unanimous message, stating that this was an issue on which it was not prepared to compromise. Any compromise on justice would, on the one hand, contravene the wishes of the survivors. On the other hand, it would set a dangerous precedent for other atrocities and other contexts around the world—from Sudan to Colombia, Gaza, and many others.
But crucially, it would constitute a violation of international law. Several international treaties, to which Ukraine, Russia, and other states are parties, including the United Nations Conventions Against Torture and Enforced Disappearances and the universally ratified Geneva Conventions, to which Ukraine, Russia, and other states are parties, expressly stipulate that grave violations of international humanitarian law, torture, and enforced disappearances must be prosecuted. The duty to prosecute is non-negotiable, and states cannot abandon it. Besides, the prohibition of torture is a jus cogens norm, meaning that countries may not relieve themselves from the obligation not to perpetrate this crime, and must investigate, prosecute, punish, and prevent it when it was committed. Whether considered from the perspective of survivors and society or in terms of specific international law, proposals to abandon justice and grant de jure or de facto amnesties simply do not stand.
Alexandra Del Biaggio: In the report, you contend that if a transitional justice process is activated now in Ukraine, it could have ripple effects across the wider post-Soviet region. How might a Ukrainian transitional justice process affect neighbors in the region, and what could it mean for other countries facing foreign military aggression or occupation around the world?
Kateryna Busol: Ukraine’s transitional justice is relevant for the post-Soviet region and Central and Eastern Europe in two dimensions. First, it will establish a substantial body of factual and legal evidence about the atrocities perpetrated during the ongoing aggression. This will also allow for an explanation—both in court proceedings in Ukraine and, I am sure, at the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression, as well as in any truth-seeking and memorialization initiative—of how these atrocities are firmly rooted in and have been catalyzed by the impunity for the Soviet and imperial crimes that Russia perpetrated.
Second, Ukraine’s approach to justice and resilience to withstand any attempts to solidify Russia’s influence should inspire other societies in the region. We have seen very positive developments in Belarus in 2020, when mass protests were held against the continuation of Lukashenko’s presidency in response to disputed elections that confirmed his victory. We saw how remarkable Belarusian society was then, how the regime cracked down, and yet it was an important demonstration of civic will and civic duty. Hopefully, the example that Ukrainians have set, at the expense of many lives, by defending their country, maintaining the rule of law, advancing the trials, and developing body of factual and legal evidence will further inspire them.
Finally, Russia has never mandated any official body to compile the evidence of and address the mass human rights violations perpetrated during the Soviet era. In a way, Ukraine’s transitional justice process will compensate for what has not been done and will provide evidence that Russian society will not be able to ignore. When they are ready and have a more mature government, Russians will also have to confront those crimes, because, ultimately during the Soviet era, those crimes were also perpetrated against Russian citizens. Therefore, it is not only a matter of empathy toward Ukrainians: It is also in Russians' interest to reckon with all the perpetrated crimes, reflect on their overall individual and societal inaction, and to understand how this has catalyzed the deeper and graver consolidation of power that has had horrible ripple effects for Russia's neighbors.
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PHOTO: Kateryna Busol speaks at a high-level panel discussion on transitional justice in Ukraine convened by ICTJ in April 2026 in Brussels, Belgium. (Maria Margarita Rivera/ICTJ)
